The Vulgar, who take Things according to their first Appearance, attribute the Uncertainty of Events to such an Uncertainty in the Causes as makes them often fail of their usual Influence; tho' they meet with no Obstacle nor Impediment in their Operation. But Philosophers, observing, that almost in every Part of Nature there is contain'd a vast Variety of Springs and Principles, which are hid, by reason of their Minuteness or Remoteness, find, that 'tis at least possible the Contrariety of Events may not proceed from any Contingency in the Cause, but from the secret Operation of contrary Causes. This Possibility is converted into Certainty by farther Observation, when they remark, that, upon an exact Scrutiny, a Contrariety of Effects always betrays a Contrariety of Causes, and proceeds from their mutual Hindrance and Opposition. A Peasant can give no better Reason for the stopping of any Clock or Watch than to say it commonly does not go right: But an Artizan easily perceives, that the same Force in the Spring or Pendulum has always the same Influence on the Wheels; but fails of its usual Effect, perhaps by Reason of a Grain of Dust, which puts a stop to the whole Movement. From the Observation of several parallel Instances, Philosophers form a Maxim, that the Connexion betwixt all Causes and Effects is equally necessary, and that its seeming Uncertainty in some In-stances
