of Intelligence and Design, that you think it extravagant to assign for its Cause, either Chance, or the blind and unguided Force of Matter. You allow, that this is an Argument, drawn from Effects to Causes. You infer, from the Order of the Work, that there must have been Project and Forethought in the Workman. If you cannot make out this Point, you allow, that your Conclusion fails; and you pretend not to establish the Conclusion in a greater Latitude than the Phænomena of Nature will justify. These are your Concessions. I desire you to mark the Consequences.
When we infer any particular Cause from an Effect, we must proportion the one to the other, and can never be allow'd to ascribe to the Cause any Qualities, but what are exactly sufficient to produce the Effect. A Body of ten Ounces rais'd in any Scale may serve as a Proof, that the counter-ballancing Weight exceeds ten Ounces; but can never afford a Reason, that it exceeds a hundred. If the Cause, assign'd for any Effect, be not sufficient to produce it, we must either reject that Cause, or add to it such Qualities as will give it a just Proportion to the Effect. But if we ascribe to it farther Qualities, or affirm it capable of producing other Effects, we can only indulge the Licence of Conjecture, and arbitrarily suppose the Existence of Qualities and Energies, without Reason or Authority.
The
