Page:An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding - Hume (1748).djvu/256

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244
ESSAY XII.

Yet still Reason must remain restless and unquiet, even with regard to that Scepticism, to which she is led by these Absurdities and Contradictions. How any clear, distinct Idea can contain Circumstances, contradictory to itself, or to any other clear, distinct Idea, is absolutely incomprehensible; and is, perhaps, as absurd as any Proposition, which can be form'd. So that nothing can be more sceptical, or more full of Doubt and Hesitation, than this Scepticism itself, which arises from some of the absurd Conclusions of Geometry or the Science of Quantity[1].

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  1. It seems to me not impossible to avoid these Absurdities and Contradictions, if it be admitted, that there is no such Thing as abstract or general Ideas, properly speaking; but that all general Ideas are, in Reality, particular ones, attach'd to a general Term, which recalls, upon Occasion, other particular ones, that resemble, in certain Circumstances, the Idea, present to the Mind. Thus when the Term, Horse, is pronounc'd, we immediately figure to ourselves the Idea of a black or a white Animal of a particular Size or Figure: But as that Term is also us'd to be apply'd to Animals of other Figures and Sizes, these Ideas, tho' not actually present to the Imagination, are easily recall'd, and our Reasoning and Conclusion proceed in the same Way, as if they were actually present. If this be admitted (as seems reasonable)

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