of this Relation than that of two Objects, which have been frequently conjoin'd together; that we have no Arguments to convince us, that Objects, which have, in our Experience, been frequently conjoin'd, will likewise, in other Instances, be conjoin'd in the same Manner; and that nothing leads us to this Inference but Custom or a certain Instinct of our Nature, which 'tis indeed difficult to resist; but which, like other Instincts, may also be fallacious and deceitful. While the Sceptic insists upon these Topics, he shows his Force, or rather, indeed, his own and our Weakness; and seems, for the Time, at least, to destroy all Assurance and Conviction. These Arguments might be display'd at a greater Length, if any durable Good or Benefit to Society could ever be expected to result from them.
For here is the chief and most confounding Objection to excessive Scepticism, that no durable Good can ever result from it; while it remains in its full Force and Vigour. We need only ask such a Sceptic, What his Meaning is? And what he proposes by all these curious Researches? He is immediately at a stand, and knows not what to answer. A Copernican or Ptolemaic, who supports, each his different System of Astronomy, may hope to produce a Conviction, which will remain, constant and durable, with his Audience.A
