Let us, then, take in the whole Compass of this Doctrine, and allow, that the Sentiment of Belief is nothing but a Conception of an Object more intense and steady than what attends the mere Fictions of the Imagination, and that this Manner of Conception arises from a customary Conjunction of the Object with something present to the Memory or Senses: I believe it will not be difficult, upon these Suppositions, to find other Operations of the Mind analogous to it, and to trace up these Phænomena to Principles still more general.
We have already observ'd, that Nature has establish'd Connexions among particular Ideas, and that no sooner one occurs to our Thoughts than it introduces its correlative, and carries our Attention towards it, by a gentle and insensible Movement. These Principles of Connexion or Association we have reduc'd to three, viz. Resemblance, Contiguity, and Causation; which are the only Bonds, that unite our Thoughts together, and beget that regular. Train of Reflection or Discourse, which, in a greater or lesser Degree, takes place amongst all Mankind. Now here arises a Question, on which the Solution of the present Difficulty will depend. Does it happen, in all these Relations, that when one of the Objects is presented to the Senses or Memory, the Mind is not only carry'd to the Conception of the Correlative, but reaches a steadier and stronger Conception of it thanwhat
