Page:An Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854, Boole, investigationofl00boolrich).djvu/193

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CHAP. XII.]
METHODS IN SECONDARY PROPOSITIONS.
177

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE METHODS AND PROCESSES TO BE ADOPTED IN THE TREATMENT OF SECONDARY PROPOSITIONS.

1. IT has appeared from previous researches (XI. 7) that the laws of combination of the literal symbols of Logic are the same, whether those symbols are employed in the expression of primary or in that of secondary propositions, the sole existing difference between the two cases being a difference of interpretation. It has also been established (V. 6), that whenever distinct systems of thought and interpretation are connected with the same system of formal laws, i.e., of laws relating to the combination and use of symbols, the attendant processes, intermediate between the expression of the primary conditions of a problem and the interpretation of its symbolical solution, are the same in both. Hence, as between the systems of thought manifested in the two forms of primary and of secondary propositions, this community of formal law exists, the processes which have been established and illustrated in our discussion of the former class of propositions will, without any modification, be applicable to the latter.

2. Thus the laws of the two fundamental processes of elimination and development are the same in the system of secondary as in the system of primary propositions. Again, it has been seen (Chap. vi. Prop. 2) how, in primary propositions, the interpretation of any proposed equation devoid of fractional forms may be effected by developing it into a series of constituents, and equating to every constituent whose coefficient does not vanish. To the equations of secondary propositions the same method is applicable, and the interpreted result to which it finally conducts us is, as in the former case (VI. 6), a system of co-existent denials. But while in the former case the force of those denials is expended upon the existence of certain classes of things, in the latter it relates to the truth of certain combinations of the ele-