sation, however distinct we may imagine them, run into one another by such insensible degrees, that it is as difficult, or perhaps more difficult, to draw the line betwixt these two, than betwixt the animal and vegetable.—That nature will not submit to be confined by our definitions and divisions, and therefore, in the study of man, as well as of other animals, and, in general, of every natural thing, we ought to attend to facts and experience, and not to systems or opinions.—That if we will have a distinguishing characteristic of our nature, the most certain seems to be, that we are more capable than any other animal yet known, of improvement in the mental faculties: And, accordingly, it was by this capability, that the antient peripatetic school defined our nature, when they said, that man was an animal capable of understanding and science.
I will only say further, that to trace this progress of our species thro' all its various stages:—To mark by what flow and insensible degrees we have past from the mere animal to the savage, and from the savage to the civilized man:—To enquire, whether, by the improvement of our faculties, we have mended our condition, and become happier as well as wiser, is the magnum opus in the philosophy[1] of man, of which only one philosopher of our times has had an idea, but none hitherto has executed.
- ↑ Monsieur J. J. Rousseau.
