Hence the qualities must be, and must also be related. But there is hence a diversity which falls inside each quality. Each has a double character, as both supporting and as being made by the relation. It may be taken as at once condition and result, and the question is as to how it can combine this variety. For it must combine the diversity, and yet it fails to do so. is both made, and is not made, what it is by relation; and these different aspects are not each the other, nor again is either . If we call its diverse aspects and , then is partly each of these. As it is the difference on which distinction is based, while as it is the distinctness that results from connection. is really both somehow together as (—). But (as we saw in Chapter ii.) without the use of a relation it is impossible to predicate this variety of . And, on the other hand, with an internal relation ’s unity disappears, and its contents are dissipated in an endless process of distinction. at first becomes in relation with , but these terms themselves fall hopelessly asunder. We have got, against our will, not a mere aspect, but a new quality , which itself stands in a relation; and hence (as we saw before with ) its content must be manifold. As going into the relation it itself is , and as resulting from the relation it itself is . And it combines, and yet cannot combine, these adjectives. We, in brief, are led by a principle of fission which conducts us to no end. Every quality in relation has, in consequence, a diversity within its own nature, and this diversity cannot immediately be asserted of the quality. Hence the quality must exchange its unity for an internal relation. But, thus set free, the diverse aspects, because each something in relation, must each be something also beyond. This diversity is fatal to the internal unity of each; and it demands a new relation, and so on without limit. In short, qualities in a relation have turned out as unintelligible as were qualities
