EXPLANATORY NOTES.
Page 15. The action of one part of the body on another percipient part may of course be indirect. In this case what is perceived is not the organ itself but the effect of the organ on another thing. The eye seen by itself in a mirror is an illustration of this.
p. 18. Compare here the Note to chapter xxi.
p. 22. For the “contrary” see Note A, and for “external relations” see Note B.
Chapter iii. In this chapter I have allowed myself to speak of ‘relations’ where relations do not actually exist. This and some other points are explained in Note B. The reader may compare pp. 141-3.
p. 30. The Reals to which I am alluding here are Herbart’s.
p. 36. By a “solid” I of course here merely mean a unit as opposed to a collection or aggregate.
p. 48. On the connection between quality and duration, cf. Note C.
p. 51. “Ideas are not what they mean.” For some further discussion on this point see Mind, N.S. IV, p. 21 and pp. 225 foll.
p. 53. A difficulty which might have been included in this chapter, is the problem of what may be called the Relativity of Motion. Has motion any meaning whatever except as the alteration of the spatial relation of bodies? Has it the smallest meaning apart from a plurality of bodies? Can it be called, to speak strictly, the state either (a) of one single body or (b) of a number of bodies? On the other hand can motion be predicated of anything apart from and other than the bodies, and, if not, can we avoid predicating it of the bodies, and, if so, is it not their state, and so in some sense a state of each?
It would of course be easy to set this out antithetically in the form, Motion (a) is and (b) is not a state of body. The reader who takes the trouble to work it out will perhaps be profited.
