pp. 253-4. With regard to the window-frame the possible objection which I had in my mind was the reply, ‘But a frame surely is at least as real as a window-pane.’ That objection, so far as I know, has not yet been made. I have however seen this urged, that, when limited transparencies are gone, we are left with empty space. But I cannot imagine why through my window should come nothing but white light, and I see nothing but blank space. Why must a transparent window, when I look through it, be a mere formless translucency?
p. 256. With regard to Redintegration—without wishing to commit myself to any decided view—I have assumed that to be fact which is generally taken to be so, viz., that among the members of a series there is reproduction only forwards, i.e. from a to b and not also from b to a. The first member in the series cannot therefore be recalled by any later member directly. This must be done indirectly and through the common character and the unity of the series. This character, because associated with the whole series inclusive of the end, can, given the end, recall the beginning. But in what this character and unity consists is a most difficult problem. It is a problem however which calls for treatment by any one who tries to deal systematically with the principles of psychology. It will be understood that in this Note I am speaking of mere serial reproduction, but that on the other hand I am not assuming that even reproduction forwards, from a to b, can be taken ultimately as merely direct.[1]
Chapter xxi. In Part III, Chapter iii, of Mr. Hobhouse’s work on the Theory of Knowledge, I find an argument against “subjective idealism “ which it may be well to consider briefly. The same argument would appear also suited, if not directed, to prove the reality of primary qualities taken as bare. And though this is very probably not intended, and though I find the argument in any case difficult to follow, I will criticise it, so far as I understand it, from both points of view.
The process seems to consist, as was natural, in an attempt at removal by elimination of all the conditions of a relation A-B, until A-B is left true and real by itself. And A-B in the present case is to be a relation of naked primary qualities, or again a relation of something apart from and independent of myself. After some assertions as to the possibility of eliminating in turn all other psychical facts but my perceptive consciousness—assertions which seem to me, as I understand them, to be wholly untenable and quite contrary to fact—the naked independence of A-B appears to be proved thus. Take a state of things where one term of the connection is observed, and the other is not observed. We have still here to infer the existence of the term unobserved, but an existence, because unobserved, free (let us say first) from all secondary qualities.
- ↑ Cf. Mind, N.S. No. 30, p. 7.
