you can deal with the Solipsist, but rather (as in this chapter I have explained) by showing that the connection which he maintains, though really essential, has not the character which he assigns to it. You may hope to convince him that he himself commits the same fault as is committed by the assertor of naked primary qualities, or of things existing quite apart from myself—the fault, that is, of setting up as an independent reality a mere abstraction from experience. You refute the Solipsist, in short, by showing how experience, as he has conceived it, has been wrongly divided and onesidedly narrowed.
p. 268. On the question whether and how far psychical states are extended, see an article in Mind, N.S. No. 14.
p. 273. I would here request the reader’s attention to the fact that, while for me “soul” and “finite centre” are not the same (p. 529), I only distinguish between them where it seems necessary.
p. 313. In the fourth line from the bottom of this page I have altered “the same. Or” into “the same, or.” The full stop was, I presume, inserted by an error. In any case I have removed it, since it may lead some reader, if not careful, to take the words “we should call them the same” absolutely. This in fact I find has been done, but the meaning was not really, I think, obscure. I am in the first place not maintaining that no continuous existence at all is wanted for the individual identity of a soul or of anything else. On the contrary I have in several places asserted the opposite. I am speaking here merely of an interval and a breach in continuous existence. And I certainly am not saying that all of us would as a fact assert individual identity despite this breach or interval. I am pointing out that, whether we assert it or deny it, we are standing in each case, so far as I can see, on no defensible principle.
I am far from maintaining that my answer to the question, “What is the soul, especially during those intervals where there seems to be no consciousness,” is wholly satisfactory. But willing and indeed anxious as I am to receive instruction on this matter from my critics, I cannot say that I have been able as yet to gain the smallest fresh light on it.
p. 333. Without entering here into detail, I will venture to make a remark which I cannot think quite uncalled-for. You cannot by making use of a formula, such as “psycho-physical parallelism”—or even a longer formula—absolve yourself from facing the question as to the causal succession of events in the body and the mind. When we say, for example, that the physical prick of a pin causes pain, is this assertion in any sense true or is it quite false? Is the pain not really to any extent, directly or indirectly, the effect of the prick? And,
