that Washington held five Hessian field-officers as hostages for Lee's personal safety. This was the beginning of a discussion that lasted about a year, involving the exchange of several letters between Howe and his government on the one hand and Howe and Washington on the other, until at length, 12 Dec., 1777, Howe was instructed to consider Lee a prisoner of war, and subject to exchange whenever convenient. During the interval, while his fate was in suspense, Lee was busy in operations on his own account. First, he assured the brothers Howe that he was opposed to the Declaration of Independence, and hoped, if he could obtain an interview with a committee from congress, to be able to open negotiations for an honorable and satisfactory adjustment of all existing difficulties. The Howes, who were well disposed toward the Americans and sincerely anxious for peace, allowed him to ask for the interview; but congress refused to grant it. Lee's extraordinary conduct before his capture had somewhat injured his reputation, and there were vague suspicions, though no one knew exactly what to suspect him of. These doubts affected the soundness of his judgment rather than of his character. His behavior was considered wayward and eccentric, but was not seen to be treacherous. The worst that was now supposed about him was that he had suffered himself to be hoodwinked by the Howes into requesting a conference that could answer no good purpose. As soon as the conference was refused, he straightway went over to the enemy, and sought to curry favor with the Howes by giving them aid and counsel for the next campaign against the Americans. He went so far as to write out for them a plan of operations. After the disastrous result of the campaigns of 1777, the brothers did not wish to disclose the secret of their peculiar obligations to such an adviser, and Lee's papers remained hidden in their domestic archives until 1857. A fac-simile of it is given in George H. Moore's monograph on the “Treason of Charles Lee” (New York, 1858). The paper is in Lee's handwriting, folded and indorsed as “Mr. Lee's Plan — 29th March, 1777.” The indorsement is in the handwriting of Henry Strachey, secretary to the royal commissioners, Lord and Sir William Howe. In this paper Lee expressly abandons the American cause, enters “sincerely and zealously” into the plans of the British commanders, and recommends an expedition to Chesapeake bay, essentially similar to that which was actually undertaken in the following summer. This advice seems to throw light upon the movements of Gen. Howe in July and August, 1777, which were formerly regarded as so strange. If anything had been known about these treacherous shifts on the part of Lee, he certainly would never have been taken back into the American service. As nothing was known about the matter, he was exchanged early in May, 1778, and joined Washington's army at Valley Forge. It is not altogether easy to see why he should have returned to his place in the American army unless it may have been with the intention of playing into the hands of the enemy; nor, except upon some such theory, is it easy to see why the British commander should have acquiesced in his return. Possibly Sir Henry Clinton, who had lately superseded Sir William Howe, may have known nothing of Lee's tergiversation; but the facts seem compatible with the supposition that in this case Sir Henry was willing to profit by treachery in the American camp, as afterward in his conspiracy with Arnold. Perhaps he was only acting upon the declared opinion of Sir Joseph Yorke, that such a man as Charles Lee was “the worst present the Americans could receive.” In the campaign of 1778 Lee proved himself to be such. When, in June, Sir Henry Clinton evacuated Philadelphia, it was his purpose to retreat across New Jersey to New York without a battle, if possible. It was Washington's object to attack Clinton on his retreat and cripple him. Lee at first endeavored to dissuade Washington from making such an attack. Then, when it was resolved to make the attack upon the rear division of the British army, with the view of cutting it off from the advanced division, Lee showed such unwillingness to undertake the task that Washington assigned it to Lafayette. Each of the opposing armies numbered about 15,000 men, and each was marching in two divisions, three or four miles apart. The American advance, of about 6,000 men under Lafayette, was to attack the British rear division upon its left flank and engage it until Washington, with the main body, should come up and complete its discomfiture. At the last moment Lee changed his mind and solicited the command of the advance, which Lafayette gracefully gave up to him. Washington's orders to Lee were explicit and peremptory. On the morning of 28 June, Lee overtook the enemy near Monmouth Court-House; but the fighting had scarcely begun when his conduct became so strange and his orders so contradictory as to excite uneasiness on the part of Lafayette, who sent a messenger back to Washington, begging him to make all possible haste to the front. When the commander-in-chief, with his main force, had passed Freehold church on the way toward the scene of action, he was astonished at the spectacle of Lee's division in disorderly retreat, with the enemy close at their heels. In a fierce outburst of wrath he upbraided Lee for his behavior, then rallied the troops, and repelled the enemy. Later in the day he sent Lee to the rear. During the night Clinton withdrew from the field, leaving his wounded behind. Lee's extraordinary conduct in failing to grasp the opportunity that all believed within his reach excited indignant comment among officers and soldiers, and he now wrote two angry letters to the commander-in-chief, to which Washington replied by placing him under arrest. He was tried by court-martial on three charges: 1. Disobedience of orders in not attacking the enemy. 2. Misbehavior before the enemy in making an unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat. 3. Disrespect to the commander-in-chief. On 12 Aug. he was found guilty on all three charges, and suspended from command in the army for the term of one year. For a long time his conduct in the battle of Monmouth seemed utterly unintelligible; the discoveries since made regarding his behavior while in captivity do not yet clear it up, but they certainly make it appear susceptible of the worst possible interpretation. On learning the sentence of the court-martial, which was presently confirmed by congress, Lee's spite against Washington became quite ungovernable, and his venomous tongue soon got him into trouble. In a duel with Washington's aide-de-camp, Col. Laurens, he was wounded in the arm. After some time he addressed an impudent letter to congress, and was immediately dismissed from the army. He retired in disgrace to his estate in the Shenandoah valley, and lived there long enough to witness the triumph of the cause he had done so much to injure. On a visit to Philadelphia he was suddenly seized with fever, and died in a tavern, friendless and alone. His last words were: “Stand by me, my brave
