arms. On the other hand, if we include the cap-
ture of the garrison at Harper's Ferry, Lee had in-
flicted greater loss upon the enemv" than he had
himself suffered. So far as the definite objects
with which he had undertaken the campaign were
concerned, it had been successful. Richmond had
been relieved of present danger. The moral situa-
tion had been reversed for a time. From standing
on the defensive, and hard pressed in front of their
own capital, the Confederates had been able to
inarch into their enemy's country, overthrowing
an army on their way, and to put the National
capital upon its defence. The spirits of the south-
ern army and people were revived, and from that
time until the last hour of the war the confidence
of both in the skill of their commander was implicit
and unquestioning. Lee was thenceforth their re-
liance and the supreme object of their devotion.
Gen. Burnside, having succeeded McClellan in command of the National army, adopted a new plan of campaign that should threaten Richmond by an advance over a short line, and at the same time keep Washington always covered. He made his base upon the Potomac at Acquia Creek, and planned to cross the Rappahannock at Fredericks- burg. The head of his column reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on 17 Nov. Lee moved promptly to meet this new advance, and occupied a line of hills in rear of the town, which commanded the plain below and afforded excellent conditions for defence. Here he posted about half his army, under Longstreet. while D. H. Plill was at Port Royal, twenty miles below, and Jackson lay be- tween, prepared to support either wing that might be attacked. Lee's total force numbered about 80,000 men of all arms ; Burnside's about 120.000, of whom 100,000 were thrown across the river on the day of the battle.
The crossing was made on 12 Dec. in two col- umns, the one at Fredericksburg and the other three miles below. No serious opposition was made to the crossing, it being Lee's plan to await attack in his strong position on the crests of the hills rather than risk an action in the plain below. Burnside spent the 12th in preparation, and did not advance to the assault until the next morning about ten o'clock. Two points of attack were chosen, one upon the Confederate right, the other upon the left. The attack upon the Confederate right was for a time successful, breaking through the first line of defence at a weak point, but it was quickly met and repelled by Jackson, who had hurried to the point of danger The National troops were forced back and pressed almost to the river, where a heavy artillery fire checked Jackson's pursuit, and upon his return to the original line of defence the battle in that quarter ended in Confederate suc- cess, but with about equal losses to the two armies. On the other side of the field the assaults were re- [)eated and determined, and resulted in much graver oss to the assailants and much less damage to the Confederates. The nature of the ground forbade all attempts to turn Lee's left, and the National troops had no choice but to make a direct advance upon Marye's Heights. Here Lee was strongly posted with artillery so placed as to enfilade the ine of advance. A little in front of his main line, and on the side of the hill below, lay a sunken road, flanked by a stonewall running athwart the line of the National advance, and forming a thoroughly protected ditch. Into this road about 2,000 infant- ry had been thrown, and Burnside's columns, as they made their successive advances up a narrow field, swept by the artillery from above, came sud- denly upon this concealed and well-protected force, and encountered a withering fire of musketry at short range, which swept them back. The nature of the obstacle was not discovered by the National commanders, and assault after assault was made, always with the same result, until the approach of night put an end to the conflict. The next day Lee waited for the renewal of the assault, which he had repelled with a comparatively small part of his force, but. although Burnside remained on the Con- federate side of the river, he made no further at- tempt to force his adversary's position. He had lost nearly 13,000 men. while Lee's loss was but a little more than 5,000. The National army recrossed the river on the 15th. and military operations were suspended for the winter. (For a further account of this battle, see Burnside, Ambrose Everett.) Gen. Joseph Hooker, who succeeded Burnside in command of the Army of the Potomac, planned a spring campaign, the purpose of which was to force Lee out of his intrenched position at Fredericks- burg and overcome him in the field. His plan of operations was to throw a strong detachment across the river below Fredericksburg, threatening an as- sault upon the works there, while with the main body of his army he should cross the river into the region known as the Wilderness above the Con- federate position, thus compelling Lee to move out of his intrenchments and march to meet his ad- vance at Chancellorsville. Lee's army had been weakened by detachments to 57.000 "men, while Hooker's strength was about 120,000, and the Na- tional commander hoped to compel the further di- vision of his adversary's force by occupying a part of it at Fredericksburg. The plan was admirably conceived, and n< operation of the war so severely tested the skill of Lee or so illustrated his charac- ter as did the brief campaign that followed.
About the end of April, 1863, the plan was put in operation. Sedgwick, with 30,000 men, crossed below Fredericksburg, while Hooker, with the main body, crossed at the fords above and marched through the Wilderness to gain a position upon the Confederate flank. Leaving about 9,000 men in the works at Fredericksburg, Lee marched on 1 May to meet Hooker's advance, which he encountered near Chancellorsville. He attacked the advance force at once, and it retired upon the main body, which occupied a strong position and seemed disposed to act upon the defensive. Notwithstanding the great inferiority of his force (48,000 men), Lee decided upon the hazardous experiment of dividing it. Retaining about 12,000 or 14.000 men with whom to make a demonstration in front, he sent Jackson with the remainder of the army to march around Hooker's right flank and strike him in the rear. The manoeuvre was extremely hazardous, but was made necessary by the situation, and was fully justified by its success. Jackson made his march without discovery of his purpose, and, late in the afternoon of 2 May, came upon Hooker's rear with a suddenness and determination that threw a part of the National army into confusion and gave the Confederates a great advantage. The contest lasted until after nightfall, and the armies lay upon their arms throughout the night. Jackson having received a mortal wound from the fire of his own men, the command of his force devolved upon Stuart, who renewed the attack early next day and pressed it with vigor until about ten o'clock, when a junction was formed with the troops under Lee, operating from in front. The whole line then advanced with great impetuosity, under the immediate command of Gen. Lee. and the enemy was driven with great loss from the field, retiring to the works that defended the river crossings.
