taken by our government, through our ministers and troops, in aiding its establishment. President Harrison, in his message to the senate submitting the treaty, declared that “the overthrow of the monarchy was not in any way promoted by this government.” On the other hand, the queen and her ministers filed with the treaty a protest, asserting that when she yielded to the provisional government she had yielded to the superior force of the United States. In order that this vital question of fact might be impartially investigated and determined, President Cleveland at once withdrew the treaty from the senate and despatched James H. Blount, of Georgia, as a special commissioner to make full examination and report.
On 18 Dec., 1893, in a special message to congress, he transmitted the report of the commissioner with all the evidence and papers connected with the case. In his message, after reviewing all the facts and confirming the finding of the commissioner, he declared that he believed “that a candid and thorough examination of the facts will force the conviction that the provisional government owes its existence to an armed invasion by the United States. . . . The lawful government of Hawaii was overthrown without the drawing of a sword or the firing of a shot, by a process every step of which, it may safely be asserted, is directly traceable to and dependent for its success upon the agency of the United States acting through its diplomatic and naval representatives.”
Referring to the principles which should govern the case, he said: “I suppose that right and justice should determine the path to be followed in treating this subject. If national honesty is to be disregarded and a desire for territorial extension or dissatisfaction with a form of government not our own ought to regulate our conduct, I have entirely misapprehended the mission and character of our government and the behaviour which the conscience of our people demands of their public servants. . . .
“ A man of true honor protects the unwritten word which binds his conscience more scrupulously, if possible, than he does the bond, a breach of which subjects him to legal liabilities; and the United States, in aiming to maintain itself as one of the most enlightened of nations, would do its citizens gross injustice if it applied to its international relations any other than a high standard of honor and morality. On that ground the United States can not properly be put in the position of countenancing a wrong after its commission any more than in that of consenting to it in advance. On that ground it can not allow itself to refuse to redress an injury inflicted through an abuse of power by officers clothed with its authority and wearing its uniform; and on the same ground, if a feeble but friendly state is in danger of being robbed of its independence and its sovereignty by a misuse of the name and power of the United States, the United States can not fail to vindicate its honor and its sense of justice by an earnest effort to make all possible reparation. . . .
“These principles apply to the present case with irresistible force when the special conditions of the queen's surrender of her sovereignty are recalled. She surrendered not to the provisional government, but to the United States. She surrendered not absolutely and permanently, but temporarily and conditionally until such time as the facts can be considered by the United States. . . .
“ By an act of war, committed with the participation of a diplomatic representative of the United States and without authority of congress, the government of a feeble but friendly and confiding people has been overthrown. A substantial wrong has thus been done which a due regard for our national character as well as the rights of the injured people require we should endeavor to repair.”
He concluded by informing congress that he should not again submit the treaty of annexation to the senate; that he had instructed our minister “to advise the queen and her supporters of his desire to aid in the restoration of the status existing before the lawless landing of the U. S. forces at Honolulu on 16 Jan. last, if such restoration could be effected upon terms providing for clemency as well as justice to all parties concerned”; and he commended the subject “to the extended powers and wide discretion of congress” for a solution “consistent with American honor, integrity, and morality.”
These proposals of the president met with strong opposition in congress, and in February, 1894, the senate committee on foreign relations made a report upholding Minister Stevens in his course with relation to the revolution. Previous to this, in December, 1893, Mr. Willis, the U. S. minister, had formally announced the president's policy to President Dole, who had returned a formal refusal to give up the government in accordance with that policy, at the same time denying the right of Mr. Cleveland to interfere. On 7 Feb., 1894, the house of representatives passed by a vote of 177 to 75 a resolution upholding Mr. Cleveland's course and condemning annexation, but a similar resolution was tabled in the senate, 36 to 18, on 29 May, and on 31 May a resolution was adopted against interference by the United States. On 4 July, 1894, the constitution of the republic of Hawaii was formally proclaimed by the revolutionary government, and Mr. Dole was declared president until December, 1900. The U. S. senate passed a resolution favoring the recognition of the new republic, and thus the matter practically passed out of Mr. Cleveland's hands.
This was not the only question of foreign policy that was forced upon the administration. Early in 1895 an insurrection broke out on the island of Cuba. Mr. Cleveland at once took measures against violation of the neutrality laws, and in his message in December he appealed for the observation of strict neutrality as a “plain duty.” Sympathy with the insurgents was wide-spread, however, and it became increasingly difficult to detect filibustering expeditions, and still more so to indict and convict those guilty of violations of neutrality. The administration was blamed in Spain for supposed failure to enforce the law, and in the United States for attempting to enforce it too stringently. Strong efforts were made to induce the administration to recognize the insurgents as belligerents, and in April, 1896, a resolution in favor of such recognition passed both houses of congress. Mr. Cleveland disregarded these resolutions as being an attempt to invade the prerogative of the executive, and Secretary Olney stated publicly that the administration regarded them merely as “an expression of opinion on the part of a number of eminent gentlemen.” Besides the resolutions just referred to others were introduced at various times providing for intervention, for special investigation, and for recognition of the Cuban republic. On 3 June, 1896, Mr. Cleveland sent Fitzhugh Lee to Havana as consul-general in place of Ramon O. Williams, and it was generally believed that Gen. Lee was expected to act in some sense as a special commissioner of the president, to report to him on the state of affairs in the island. Many expected that the appointment
