authorities, but congress failed to appropriate the amount, and the claims remained unsettled. The customary yearly proclamations against poaching were issued, but, owing to the inadequacy of the provisions for its prevention adopted by the Paris tribunal, the seal herd continued to decrease.
To pass from foreign to domestic affairs, the unsettled financial state of the country during a large part of Mr. Cleveland's second term first demands notice. On 8 Aug., 1893, the president convened congress in special session because, as stated in his message of that date, of “the existence of an alarming and extraordinary business situation, involving the welfare and prosperity of all our people,” and to the end that “through a wise and patriotic exercise of the legislative duties . . . present evils may be mitigated and dangers threatening the future may be averted.” The country was in the midst of a financial crisis, largely due, it was believed, to past unsound legislation, under which the gold reserve had been diminishing, silver accumulating, and expenditures exceeding revenue. Confidence had become impaired and credit shaken. Business interests and the conservative sentiment of the country demanded the repeal of the provisions of the act of 14 July, 1890 (popularly known as the Sherman act), which required the monthly purchase of four and one-half million ounces of silver and the issue of treasury notes in payment therefor. Such repeal the president strongly recommended, declaring that “our unfortunate financial plight is not the result of untoward events, nor of conditions related to our natural resources; nor is it traceable to any of the afflictions which frequently check natural growth and prosperity,” but is “principally chargeable to congressional legislation touching the purchase and coinage of silver by the general government.” Reviewing such legislation, he said: “The knowledge in business circles among our own people that our government can not make its fiat equivalent to intrinsic value, nor keep inferior money on a parity with superior money by its own independent efforts, has resulted in such a lack of confidence at home in the stability of currency values that capital refuses its aid to new enterprises, while millions are actually withdrawn from the channels of trade and commerce, to become idle and unproductive in the hands of timid owners. Foreign investors, equally alert, not only decline to purchase American securities, but make haste to sacrifice those which they already have.” He insisted that “the people of the United States are entitled to a sound and stable currency, and to money recognized as such on every exchange and in every market of the world. Their government has no right to injure them by financial experiments opposed to the policy and practice of other civilized states, nor is it justified in permitting an exaggerated and unreasonable reliance on our national strength and ability to jeopardize the soundness of the people's money.”
The house promptly, and by a large majority, repealed the obnoxious provisions. In the senate a strong and determined minority resisted the repeal, and, taking advantage of the unlimited debate there permitted, delayed action for many weeks. In the heat of the contest a compromise was practically agreed upon in the senate, which was defeated only by the firm opposition of the president. He insisted upon unconditional repeal, which was finally enacted 1 Nov., 1893.
Soon after, one of the suggested measures of compromise, which provided among other things for the immediate coinage of so much of the silver bullion in the treasury as represented the seigniorage (declared to be $55,156,681), was embodied in a bill which passed both houses of congress. This bill the president vetoed as “ill-advised and dangerous.” He said: “Sound finance does not commend a further infusion of silver into our currency at this time unaccompanied by further adequate provision for the maintenance in our treasury of a safe gold reserve.”
At the first regular session of the fifty-third congress, opened 4 Dec., 1893, the question of tariff revision was at once considered. In his message of that date the president, after reviewing the work and needs of the various departments of government, dwelt with special emphasis on the necessity of immediately undertaking this important reform.
“Manifestly, if we are to aid the people directly through tariff reform, one of its most obvious features should be a reduction in present tariff charges upon the necessaries of life. The benefits of such a reduction would be palpable and substantial, seen and felt by thousands who would be better fed and better clothed and better sheltered. . . .
“Not less closely related to our people's prosperity and well-being is the removal of restrictions upon the importation of the raw materials necessary to our manufactures. The world should be open to our national ingenuity and enterprise. This can not be while federal legislation, through the imposition of high tariff, forbids to American manufacturers as cheap materials as those used by their competitors.”
A tariff bill, substantially following the lines suggested by the president and providing among other things for free wool, coal, iron ore, and lumber, was framed by the committee on ways and means, and, with the addition of free sugar and an income tax, passed the house on 1 Feb., 1894. In the senate the bill was amended in many items, and generally in the direction of higher duties. After five months of prolonged discussion the bill, as amended, passed the senate by a small majority, all the democrats voting for it except Senator Hill, of New York. It was then referred to a conference committee of both houses to adjust the differences between them. A long and determined contest was there waged, principally over the duties upon coal, iron ore, and sugar. It was understood that a small group of democratic senators had, contrary to the express wishes and pledges of their party and by threats of defeating the bill, forced higher duties in important schedules. While the bill was pending before the conference committee the president, in a letter to Mr. Wilson, the chairman of the ways and means committee, which later was read to the house, strongly urged adherence to the position which the house had taken.
The house, however, finally receded from its position in the belief that any other course would defeat or long delay any reduction of the tariff, and that the business interests of the country demanded an end to the conflict. The bill, as amended, passed both houses, and at midnight of 27 Aug., 1894, became a law without the signature of the president. In a published letter of the same date he gave his reasons for withholding his approval. While he believed the bill was a vast improvement over existing conditions, and would certainly lighten many tariff burdens which rested heavily on the people, he said: “I take my place with the rank and file of the democratic party who believe in tariff reform and well know what it is, who refuse to accept the results embodied in this bill as the close of the war, who are not blinded to the fact that the livery of democratic tariff reform has been stolen and worn in the service of republican protection, and who
