Page:Appletons' Cyclopædia of American Biography (1900, volume 2).djvu/562

On the fall of Lord North's ministry in March, 1782, Franklin sent a letter to his friend, Lord Shelburne, expressing a hope that peace might soon be made. When the letter reached London, the new ministry, in which Shelburne was secre- tary of state for home and colonies, had already been formed, and Shelburne, with the consent of the cabinet, replied by sending over to Paris an agent to talk with Franklin informally, and ascer- tain the terms upon which the Americans would make peace. The person chosen for this purpose was Richard Oswald, a Scottish merchant of frank disposition and liberal views. In April there were several conversations between Oswald and Frank- lin, in one of which the latter suggested that, in order to make a durable peace, it was desirable to remove all occasion for future quarrel ; that the line of frontier between New York and Canada was inhabited by a lawless set of men, who in time of peace would be likely to breed trouble between their respective governments ; and that therefore it would be well for England to cede Canada to the United States. A similar reasoning would apply to Nova Scotia. By ceding these countries to the United States, it would be possible, from the sale of una])i>ropriated lands, to indemnity the Americans for all losses of private property during the war, and also to make reparation to the Tories whose estates had been confiscated. By pursuing such a policy, England, which had made war on America unjustly, and had wantonly done it great injuries, would achieve not merely peace, but re- conciliation with America, and reconciliation, said Franklin, is " a sweet word." This was a very bold tone for Franklin to take : but he knew that al- most every member of the Whig ministry had pub- licly expressed the opinion that the war against America was unjust and wanton; and being, moreover, a shrewd hand at a bargain, he began by setting his terms high. Oswald seems to have been convinced by Franklin's reasoning, and ex- pressed neither surprise nor reluctance at the idea of ceding Canada. The nuiin points of this con- versation were noted upon a sheet of paper, which Franklin allowed Oswald to take to London and show to Lord Shelburne, first writing upon it an express declaration of its informal character. On receiving this memorandum, Shelburne did not show it to the cabinet, but returned it to Franklin without any immediate answer, after keeping it only one night. Oswald was presently sent back to Paris, empowered as commissioner to negotiate with Franklin, and carried Shelburne's answer to the memorandum that desired the cession of Cana- da for three reasons. The answer was terse : " 1. By way of reparation. — Answer : No reparation can be heard of. 2. ?b prevent fnfure wars. — An- swer : It is to be hoped that some more friendly method will be found. 3. As a fund of indemnifi- cation to loyalists. — Answer : No independence to be acknowledged without their being taken care of." Besides, added Shelburne, the Americans would be expected to make some compensation for the surrender of Charleston, Savannah, and the city of New York, still held by British troops. From this it appears that Shelburne, as well as Franklin, knew how to begin by asking more than he was likely to get. England was no more likely to listen to a proposal for ceding Canada than the Americans were to listen to the suggestion of com- pensating the British for surrendering New York. But there can be little doubt that the bold stand thus taken by Franklin at the outset, together with the influence he acquired over Oswald, contributed materially to the brilliant success of the American negotiations. This is the more important to be noted in connection with the biography of Frank- lin, since in the later stages of the negotiations the initiative passed almost entirely out of his hands, and into those of his colleagues, Jay and Adams. The form that the treaty took was mainly the work of these younger statesmen ; the services of Frank- lin were chiefly valuable at the beginning, and again, to some extent, at the end. There were two grave difficulties in making a treaty. The first was, that France was really hostile to the American claims. She wished to see the country between the AUeghanies and the Mississippi divided between England and Spain ; England to have the region north of the Ohio, and the region south of it to remain an Indian territory under the protectorate of Spain, except a narrow strip on the western slope of the AUeghanies, over which the United States might exercise protectorship. In other words, France wished to confine the United States to the east of the AUeghanies, and forever prevent their expansion westward. France also wished to exclude the Americans from all share in the fish- eries, in order to prevent the United States from becoming a great naval power. As France, up to a certain jioint, was our ally, this antagonism of in- terests made the negotiation extremely difficult. The second difficulty was the unwillingness of the British government to acknowledge the indepen- dence of the United States as a condition that must precede all negotiation. The Americans insisted upon this point, as they had insisted ever since the Staten Island conference in 1776 ; but England wished to withhold the recognition long enough to bargain with it in making the treaty. This diffi- culty was enhanced by the fact that, if this point were conceded to the Americans, it would transfer the conduct of the treaty from the colonial secre- tary, Shelburne, to the foreign secretary. Fox ; and these two gentlemen not only differed widely in their views of the situation, but were personally bitter enemies. Presently Fox heard of the private memorandum that Shelburne had received from Franklin but had not shown to the cabinet, and he concluded, quite wrongly, that Shelburne was play- ing a secret part for purposes of his own. Accord- ingly, Fox made up his mind at all events to get the American negotiations transfen'ed to his own department ; and to this end, on the last day of June, he moved in the cabinet that the indepen- dence of the United States should be uncondition- ally acknowledged, so that England might treat as with a foreign power. The motion was lost, and Fox prepared to resign his office; but the very next day the death of Lord Rockingham broke up the ministry. Lord Shelburne now became prime minister, and other circumstances occurred which simplified the problem. In April the French fleet in the West Indies had been annihilated by Rod- ney ; in September this was followed by the total defeat of the combined French and Spanish forces at Gibraltar. This altered the situation seriously. England, though defeated in America, was victori- ous as regarded France and Spain. The avowed object for which France had entered into alliance with the Americans was to secure the indepen- dence of the United States, and this point was now substantially gained. The chief object for which Spain had entered into alliance with France was to drive the English from Gibraltar, and this point was now decidedly lost. France had bound herself not to desist from the war until Spain should re- cover Gibraltar; but now there was little hope of accomplishing this, except by some fortunate bar- gain in the treaty. Vergennes now tried to sat-