National batteries were ready to open, and their
general. Magruder, expressed his surprise that
they were not stormed without all this engineering
work. He said that with 5,000 men he held 100,-
000 in checlc, refusing to obey orders to leave the
place until the batteries were ready to open. On
10 April Norfolk was occupied by Gen. Wool. On
the other hand, it may be said that McClellan's
caution was not without its peculiar logic. It was
the first engagement since the battle of Bull Run.
McClellan could afford to wait rather than to risk
much; but criticism, in the light of later events,
warrants the opinion that his habits as an engi-
neer and his lack of experience, combined with a
systematic character of mind, in which delibera-
tion was a strong factor, caused him to be un-
necessarily slow in this early portion of the cam-
paign, lie was deceived by the enemy as to" the
numbers in his front, and was misled by false maps
of the terrain, in which the directions of streams
and the localities of roads were wrong. Accord-
ing to the returns on 1 April, 18G2, the army
was divided into four corps, those of McDowell,
Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes, with a division
of regular infantry and cavalry and a reserve ar-
tillery, numbering in grand aggregate on the rolls
of 1 April, 1863, 119,965 men. This does not
include McDowell's corps, which was soon de-
tached and did not participate in the peninsular
campaign. Richmond was the objective point.
The southern portion of the peninsula is flat and
marshy, with a salt tide on York river as far as
West Point and on the James beyond City Point.
Northeast of Richmond flows the Pamunkey, join-
ing the Mattapony to form York river. Between
the Pamunkey and the upper James, flowing north
of Richmond, is the Chickahominy, which, passing
through wooded swamps and flowing south into
the James, proved during the rainy periods a
much more difficult obstacle than had been antici-
pated. There are thickets of white oak inter-
spersed with pool-like extensions. Thus, while in
dry seasons it was a brook, in wet ones it was a
broad river with swampy banks. After the evacu-
ation of Yorktown, the occupation of Williams-
burg was contested on 5 and 6 May. The appor-
tionment of troops to the attack was not wisely
calculated. Hooker complained that for nine
hours his division of thirteen regiments bore the
brunt of the enemy's attacks without support, al-
though there were 30,000 men in sight unengaged.
Williamsburg was abandoned by the enemy and
the forward movement was resumed. The dis-
tance to Richmond is about fifty miles. As the
Confederates fell back to cover their capital, fight-
ing in retreat, the National army advanced, meet-
ing with no strong resistance until it was estab-
lished on the Chickahominy. Had McClellan then
made his change of base, the James river be-
ing opened, he would doubtless have been success-
ful. The Confederate iron-clads ran up as far as
Drewry's Blulf on 15 May, and on the 18th Mc-
Clellan had reached the Chickahominy. The near-
est part of this river is only five miles from Rich-
mond; but there are large swamps intervening,
which in rainy seasons form a decided military ob-
stacle. McClellan's advance was well in position
by 23 May. Franklin's division had now ascended
York river, and the base of operations for the army
was the White House on the York River railroad
where it crosses the Pamunkey, twenty-four miles
east of Richmond. In expectation of the junction
with McDowell, Gen. Fitz-John Porter had ad-
vanced to Hanover Court-House, north of Rich-
mond, where on 24 May he defeated a Confederate
force. As McDowell did not come, and it became
known that he would not, Porter was returned to
his original camp. The river now divided the
Army of the Potomac, and the communications
were precarious. The army advanced upon Rich-
mond along the Chickahominy, now greatly swollen — the left wing in four divisions along the York
River railroad, south of the Chickahominy, and the
right wing, consisting of five divisions, by the op-
posite bank, the swollen stream rushing between,
and no bridge being a sure communication except
Bottom's bridge, below the railroad crossing. On
the night of 30 May the Confederates, taking ad-
vantage of a deluge of rain, moved out under Gen.
Joseph E. Johnston to attack the National left,
which it would be difficult to support from the
north. Early the next day Longstreet and Hill
attacked, and there was fought the battle of Fair
Oaks, called by the Confederates Seven Pines.
Casey's division was driven back, and Couch and
Heintzelman coming to his support were about to
succumb. The enemy audaciously attempted to
pass between the left wing and the river and to
seize Bottom's bridge, when McClellan. sick in
bed, ordered Sumner to attempt the crossing of
the tottering bridge in his front. Sumner already
had his corps prepared to move at a word, and
Sedgwick's division rushed across, planted a bat-
tery of twenty-four Napoleon guns so as to flank
the Confederate advance, and hurled the attacking
force back upon Fair Oaks station. Had the en-
tire army crossed, the capture of Richmond might
soon have followed. When the Confederates re-
newed their attack on 1 June, it was without
proper concert, and they were repelled with a loss
of 4,233 men. The Federal loss was 5,739. Soon
afterward the National army recovered its posts at
Fair Oaks, but made no further attempts to cap-
ture Richmond. Gen. J. E. Johnston had been
severely wounded, and his place was taken by Gen.
G. W. Smith, while Gen. Robert E. Lee was in
chief command in the city.
Two events now occurred to embarrass McClel- lan's further movement: the first was a demonstra- tion that had been made by "Stonewall" Jackson upon Washington, and the other a raid of Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, on 12 and 13 June, with 1,500 cavalry, around the right flank of the National army, de- stroying stores and capturing provisions. The course taken by McClellan, whatever may be the opinion whether a retreat was necessary, was bold, and skilfully carried out. McDowell withheld, and Jackson again in line before Richmond, he deter- mined to fall back to reorganize and plan anew, and, preparatory to this, he would make a change of base. White House could no longer be safely held; the James river was open; transports had already reached City Point. Thus the new base was correct for a new movement upon Richmond. He determined upon a flank movement to the James by substantially a single road, open on his flank to many roads, of which he would have to contest every foot of the way. The divisions north of the Chickahominy were to be carefully and se- cretly withdrawn, the bridges utilized for trains. Large detachments thrown out toward Richmond were to resist the enemy's assaults and cover the movement. To divert the attention of the enemy, McClellan sent Gen. Stoneman with cavalry to make a raid in their rear on 23 June, but they were not entirely deceived. Ignorant at first of lAlcClel- lan's purpose, they swarmed upon him, and then occurred that contest called the Seven days' bat- tles, from 25 June to 1 July.
On 25 June Hooker had been advanced beyond
