the Confederates was assured. As soon as the
conflict was ended, the Army of the Potomac re-
sumed its retreat upon Harrison's Landing, which
it reached by noon on 2 July, and was then secure
from any further attack. The boldest and most
impulsive spirits in the army were of opinion that,
had a vigorous advance been ordered as a riposte
after the attack on Malvern, such were the con-
fusion and disorder in the Confederate ranks, that
Richmond could have been captured without fur-
ther delay. But the condition of the men rendered
this almost impossible.
When, on 7 July, President Lincoln visited the army, he found more than 80,000 men there, al- though Gen. McClellan had reported a smaller number by reason of confused returns. He asked for more troops and another trial ; but he had lost the confidence of the President and his advisers, and neither his request nor his advice was lis- tened to. On 8 July Gen. Burnside brought up re- enforcements from Roanoke island, and some days later Lee's army began to withdraw for a north- ern campaign. On the 11th Gen. Halleck was made general-in-chief, and on 3 Aug. McClellan was ordered to evacuate the peninsula. He was di- rected also to repair in person first to Fort Mon- roe and then to Alexandria, and was relieved of his command, and ordered to send every available soldier to the new army of .Virginia under Gen. John Pope, an army that had been formed by con- solidation of the forces under Gens. Fremont, Banks, and McDowell. These three organizations were now known as the 1st, 2d, and 3d corps re- spectively. (See Pope, John.) The second battle of Bull Run, 30 Aug., 1862, was even more disas- trous than the first, and on 2 Sept. Pope resigned the command. In this emergency the government looked to ]McClellan as the only man who could inspire confidence and bring order out of chaos. He himself says that, pending the time when a general could be selected, he had only a verbal order or request to assume control ; that in point of fact he never was fully in command, and that thus, without a warrant to show, not only his repu- tation, but his life depended upon some measure of success in a situation that seemed almost hopeless. Before setting out to meet the Confederate army in Maryland, he left his card with a P. P. C. for the President, and departed without an official word from the secretary of war or the general-in- chief. He had been in virtual command, from 2 to 7 Sept., in charge of the defences of the city. Flushed with his recent victories, Lee was march- ing into Maryland, and must be met and checked by the remnants of Pope's army and the Army of the Potomac. It is touching to read of the men's joy and renewed confidence when they knew that " Little Mac " was again in command. The mag- netism was like that ascribed to Napoleon. Or- ganizing as he proceeded, he marched into Mary- land parallel with Lee, who had advanced as far as Frederick. Lee was disappointed by the coolness of his reception, and on the approach of McClellan fell back to Turner's and Crampton's gaps in the South mountain, where he was defeated and driven from the former by Reno's corps, and from the lat- ter by Franklin on 13 and 14 Sept. McClellan was now to encounter the full force of the enemy on Antietam creek, a small tributary of the Potomac, which it joins about seven miles north of Harper's Ferry. By the failure of Gen. Miles to fortify Maryland heights, and in spite of the entreaties of McClellan that Harper's Ferry should be almn- doned and its garrison added to his army. Jackson captured the post on 13 Sept. and took 11,500 pris- oners. He was thus enabled to join forces with Lee at Antietam. On the Kith Lee had only two divisions across the Potomac, but the National army did not come into position till the 17th. Mc- Clellan placed Plooker and Mansfield on the right, next came Sumner, with Franklin as a support, Burnside was on the left, and Porter in the centre. Lee had placed his army in the acute angle in- closed by the Potomac and the Antietam ; on the heights between the two streams, to the right and left of the Boonsboro road, he had posted Long- street and Hill, with Hood on the left. In the centre of the position was the Dunker church, which seemed an objective point for both armies. Three stone bridges cross the Antietam, and there are also several fords. The bridge on the left was in front of Burnside, the central one in front of Porter, and the right opposite Hooker and Mans- field. MeClellan's plan was for Hooker to cross and attack the enemy's left, supported if necessary by Sumner and Franklin, and upon the apparent suc- cess of that attack Burnside was to cross the bridge in his front, press the enemy's right, passing if possible to the south and rear of Sharpsburg. At daylight on the morning of the 17th Hooker, fol- lowed by Mansfield, having crossed the stream, made so furious an attack upon Hood and Jackson that they were driven back beyond the Dunker church. Re-enforced by D. H. Hill, the Confed- erates returned the attack, and drove Hooker back in turn. Then Sumner came up, moved forward, was driven back, and again, with Franklin's aid, forced them beyond the Dunker church. Sumner even attempted to move, with a portion of his corps, to the left upon Sharpsbiu'g, but he could only hold his ground. But the movements on the left were less fortunate. Burnside had been or- dered at 8 A. M. to take the stone bridge, and aid the general movements by occupying the heights beyond. The approach to the bridge being swept by the guns of the enemy, the order to take it was not obeyed until 1 o'clock, when the Confederates had so strengthened their position beyond it that it was impossible to dislodge them. Thus it hap- pened that the principal fighting was on the right, where Mansfield was killed, and Hooker wounded. The desperate attempts of the enemy to pierce the National line on the right and centre were foiled. In spite of repeated orders, the failure of Burn- side's corps to take the lower stone bridge invali- dated MeClellan's combinations, and to some ex- tent neutralized his success. Had it been carried early in the day. Lee might have been driven pell- mell into the Potomac. As it was, when we con- sider all the circumstances, the forcing back of the Confederate line, and their inability to make any effect upon the National line, the engagement at Antietam, so often regarded as only a drawn bat- tle, must be looked upon as a decided success. About 13,000 men fell on each side, but McClellan retained the field when the enemy, his plans entire- ly foiled, sullenly withdrew. As an offset to the disaster of Harper's Ferry, McClellan had, in this brief campaign, taken 13 guns, 39 colors, upward of 15,000 stand of arms, and more than 6,000 pris- oners, while he had not lost a gun or a color. No swift pursuit was attempted, and Lee crossed the Potomac at his leisure on the 19th. McClellan then followed, advancing his army between Longstreet's corps and the main body under Lee, and halted at Warrenton to recruit, while the powers at Wash- ington, withholding all praise for what he and his army had achieved, were scolding him for his de- lay. He needed supplies of all kinds, and with re- gard to the arrival of these there has since been a
