and engaging it as soon as it should appear in American watere devolved upon Admiral Sampson. On 4 May he sailed from Key West eastward for the purpose of observation. On 7 May, at Cape Haytien, he received despatches from Washington advising him that Cervcra was reported at St. Thomas. He continued eastward in hopes of finding the enemy, bombarded San Juan de Puerto Rico on the 12th, which convinced him that the Spanish fleet was not there, and then returned to the westward. On the 17th the flag-ship left the squadron in Bahama channel and proceeded to Key West. The navy department was informed by Col. James Allen, of the U. S. signal service corps at Key West, on 19 May, that the Spanish fleet had arrived in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba on that morning. The department was not convinced, however, of the accuracy of the report. On that same day the flying squadron under command of Commodore W. S. Schley sailed from Key West to Cienfuegos with instructions to establish a blockade at that place, the department believing that Cervera would attempt first to reach Cienfuegos, a port from which the munitions of war he carried might be transported by rail to Havana. On the 20th the department informed Sampson of the report that Cervera was at Santiago, and advised him to order Schley with his squadron to that port. Sampson left Key West for Havana on the 21st, having jireviously sent despatches to Schley by the "Marblehead," telling him of the reported arrival f>f Cervera at Santiago, and directing him to proceed thither if he were satisfied the enemy was not at Cienfuegos. On the day following, the 22d, Sampson received a despatch from Key West stating that Cervera had been in the harbor of Santiago on the aist. Accordingly, on the 2<Jd he sailed eastward from Havana, intending to occupy Nicholas channel, and thereby to prevent the approadi of the enemy in that direction. On the 26tn he received despatches from Schley dated the 23d, to the effect that the latter was by no means satisfied that the enemy was not at Cienfuegos. In answer to this the "Wasp" was sent on the 27th to inform Schley that the Spanish squadron had been certainly at Santiago from the 19th to the 35th, and to direct him to proceed to that port at once. On the same day Sampson received two telegrams from Schley, dated 24 May, stating that he was satisfied the enemy was not at Cienfuegos, that he was about to start eastward, but that since his coal supply was low and coaling off Cienfuegos was uncertain he could not blockade Santiago if the enemy were there, and therefore he should proceed to Mole St. Nicholas. Sampson sent at once the "New Orleans'" to Santiago with orders to Schley "to remain on the blockade at Santiago at all hazards, assuming that the Spanish vessels are in that port." He himself sailed that same day for Key West, where he arrived on the 28th, and" cabled to Schley emphasizing the importance of learning at once from persons ashore whether Cervera were at Santiago. Schley had left Cienfuegos on the evening of the 24th, and was some twenty miles to the south antl east of Santiago at about 5.30 p. m. of the 26lh, when he stojiped to nuikc repairs to the collier " Merrinnic." On that evening the squadron steamed away to the westward; on the 27th Schley received despatches from Secretary Jjong by the "Harvard " ordering him to ascertain definitely whether Cervera were at Santiago. In answer he replied that obedience to orders was impossible on account of lack of coal, that he could learn nothing positive in regard to the enemy. and that he must proceed to Key West for coal. He sailed to the westward, and then at 1.12 p. m. on 28 May signalled to return toward Santiago. Early on the succeeding morning the Spanish man-of-war "Cristobal Colon" was seen lying at anchor inside the harbor; later another war-ship and two smaller vessels were seen. At 10 a. m. of that day Schley cabled that the enemy was in the harbor. He then lay off the port watching the enemy and exchanging shots with him on the morning of the 31st. Sampson ai'rived off Santiago on 1 June and assumed coiinnand of the combined fleet. He established a close and efiieient blockade, ordering the harbor to be guarded day and night by the squadron arranged in a serai-circle, six miles from the harbor mouth by day and four by night, directing search-lights to be thrown upon the entrance at night, and providing in standing orders a plan of attack by which the vessels were to close in at once upon the enemy in case he should come out. On 3 June Naval Constructor Hobson {q. v.) made the attempt to sink the "Merrimac" in the harbor month, and thus to shut off the enemy, a plan that had iieen devised by Sampson as early as 27 May, when he had ordered Schley to use the "Sterling" to obstruct the channel. Fortunately the attempt thus to block the channel was not successful, although it did bring well-earned lame to the gallant men that undertook its execution. On 7 June possession was taken of Guantanamo as a liarbor of refuge for the fleet, and on 10 June the first battalion of marines was landed there. The men kept their position, fighting for days with scarcely an intermission. Sampson was instructed in May to provide convoy for the troops about to be sent by the war department from Tampa. These troops arrived off Santiago on 21 June under Gen. Shatter (q. v.). Through his chief of staff Sampson communicated with Shatter and explained that it was necessary to carry the positions occupied by the eastern and western batteries of the enemy in order to enable the ships to enter the harbor. Shatter assented to this view, selected Daiquiri as his landing-place, and began disembarkation on the 22d.
It is not the place here to speak of the operations of the army on land. Suffice it to say that, after shelling the vicinity of Daiquiri as a preliminary to the landing of the troops, the ships bombarded the forts at, Aguadores on 1 July in accordance with a request from Shatter, and on the next day bombarded the batteries at the entrance of the harbor. Sampson informed Shaffer that it was not possible to force an entrance until the channel should be cleared of mines, which could be done only after the forts guarding the entrance to the harbor had been captured. Further communications followed between the two, and on the morning of 3 July Sampson on his Hag-ship "New York" left the fleet to meet Shaffer at Siboney for a prearranged conference. When the flag-ship was about seven miles from the entrance to Santiago the Spanish fleet was discovered steaming out of the harbor. At once the ship put about and started to the west, signalling to the other vessels to close in and engage the enemy. This command had been provided for already in general orders, however, and no sooner had the smoke that showed the enemy was escaping been discovered than the blockading vessels had driven ahead to meet the Spaniards at close quarters. This was at 9.30 a. m. The enemy turned to the westward and was followed by the entire squadron. It was a running fight. The Spanish fire was feeble, erratic, and ineffective, and that of our ships, here
