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PRELUDE TO CHAPTER V.
This chapter assumes the existence of a generic matter, as well as something which is to give to it reality, and thus it seems to admit of formative conditions other than those assigned to Vital Principle; the mind too, although said to be immaterial, is likened to a material agent. Aristotle[1] elsewhere, somewhat in conformity with this, says, "even granting that all things may be from one, or more than one primal element, and that the self-same matter may be the source of all beings, yet there is a peculiar matter for each genus, as pituita is the primal matter for sweet and oily, as the matter of bile is for bitter and analogous qualities." An early commentator observes, "matter is the receptacle and subject of forms, without having in itself either figure, quality, magnitude, or place; nevertheless, it is not a mere name, but truly exists as the basis of qualities. Matter
- ↑ Metaphys. VII. 4. I.
