reality, ought to have some other appellation than that of instruction. We may not then, as has been observed, say of the individual who, from being in potentiality, learns and receives knowledge from one who is in reality and able to teach, that he suffers impression, or else it must be admitted that there are two modes of change, one in privative dispositions, and another over habits and nature. The first change, however, of this kind in the sentient being comes from the parent at the moment of conception; as from that moment the being has, as it were, learning and sensibility. There is an analogy between the state of activity and reflexion just alluded to, but with this difference, that the impressions productive of activity, as the audible, the visible, and others, are all derived from without; and the cause of this is that sensation, in activity, is employed upon particulars, knowledge upon universals; and universals are, in some way, in the Vital Principle itself. The act of thinking, therefore, is dependant[1] only upon the will of the individual, which is not the case with sentient perception, as for it there must of necessity be objects to be perceived; and this holds good, and for the same reason, with respect to the sciences which are engaged upon external objects, because all such objects are among particulars, and are external to the percipient. But an opportunity may hereafter present itself for the further elucidation of the subject.
- ↑ Sic!
