sinews of his armies. Every Mughal Emperor, even the orthodox Aurangzíb, had carried on Akbar's policy of marrying Rájput princesses, and seeking them as wives for his sons. It was a distinct loss of caste to the queens, and the Rájput pride kicked sorely at it; but there were counter-balancing advantages in such alliances, and they undoubtedly tended to bind the Native Chiefs to the Mughal throne.
What with Rájputs, Pátáns, and Persians, to say nothing of the parties in the Deccan, Aurangzíb had a difficult population to deal with; and his first object, in self-defence, was to maintain a sufficient standing army to overawe each separate source of insurrection. He could indeed rely upon the friendly Rájas to take the field with their gallant followers against a Shí'ite kingdom in the Deccan, or in Afghánistán, and even against their follow Rájputs, when the imperial cause happened to coincide with their private feuds. He could trust his Persian officers in a conflict with Pátáns or Hindús, though never against their Shí'ite coreligionists in the Deccan. But he needed a force devoted to himself alone, a body of retainers who looked to him for rank and wealth, and even the bare means of subsistence. This he found in the species of feudal system which had been inaugurated by Akbar. Just as the early 'Abbásid Khalifs had found safety and a sound imperial organization by selecting their provincial governors, not from the arrogant chiefs of the Arab clans, but from among their own freedmen, people
