definite period; but memory is differentiated from mere passive recognition by its power of actively reproducing the past.
Later on, it was seen that mere individuation, the characterestic of all organic differentation, and individuality, man's possession, are different. And finally it was found that it was necessary to distinguish carefully between love, peculiar to man, and the sexual instinct, shared by the animals. The two are allied inasmuch as they are both efforts at immortality.
The desire for worth was referred to as a human character, absent in the animals where there is only a desire for satisfaction. The two are analagous, and yet fundamentally different. Pleasure is craved; worth is what we feel we ought to crave. The two have been confused, with the worst results for psychology and ethics. There has been a similar confusion between personality and persons, between recognition and memory, sexuality and love.
All these antitheses have been continually confused, and, what is even more striking, almost always by men with the same views and theories, and with the same object—that of trying to obliterate the difference between man and the lower animals.
There are other less known distinctions which have been equally neglected. Limited consciousness is an animal trait; the active power of noticing is a purely human one. It is evident that there is something in common in the two facts, but still they are very different. Desire, or impulse, and will are nearly always spoken of as if they were identical. The former is common to all living creatures, but man has, in addition, a will, which is free, and no factor of psychology, because it is the foundation of all psychological experiences The identification of impulse and will is not solely due to Darwin; it occurred also in Schopenhauer's conception of the will, which was sometimes biological, sometimes purely philosophical.
I may group the two sets of factors as follows:
