material but intelligible, as God, Angel, and other ſuch. The three firſt vertues, feeling, bodily wit, and imagination, are scituate in the ſoule, that it is coupled to the body, and giueth life and inner wit & vtter wit to perfection of the body. And theſe thrée vertues be common to men and to other beaſts: But the other vertues, Racio and Intellectus, be in the ſoule, in that it may be departed from the body, and abide departed as an Angell, and that by two manner of reſpects. For it beholdeth the higher things and ſo it is called Intellectus: and beholdeth the neather things, and ſo it is called Racio. In that the ſoule is compared to this end, it hath thrée manner of vertues, one is Racionalis, whereby it taketh héede to the thing that is true: The other is called Concupiſubilis, whereby it taketh héed to the thing that is good, the third is called Iraſcibilis, and thereby it taketh héede ye thing that is great and huge, and to the thing that is euerlaſting. In the Rationali is knowledge of the truth, in Concupiſcibili, wil and deſire of good thing: in Iraſcibili is flight of contrary, that is, of euill. And ſo euery vertue thus conſidered taketh in this manner knowledge of the truth, either that it deſireth good, either indeuoureth to flie harme. All the wits come of that vertue Rational and apprehenſiue. All affections and deſire, of Concupiſcibili and Iraſcibili. Which affections bée foure, that is to ſay, Ioy, Hope, Dreade and Sorrowe. The firſt two come of Concupiſcibili, for of the thing that we couet and deſire, we haue ioy, and in ioying we hope. The other two, dread and ſorrow, come of the Iraſcibili. For of things that we hate we haue ſorrowe, and in ſorrowing we dread. Theſe foure affections be the matter of all manner vices and vertues, as it is in another place ſhewed, and that appereth by Auſten in the booke De Anima & ſpiritu, where all thoſe thinges are declared.
¶Of the powers of the ſoule. Chap. 7.
If we take héed to the ſoule in compariſon to his working, wee finde three manner of vertues, Vegetabilis, that giueth lyfe, Senſibilis, that giueth feeling, Racionalis, that giueth reaſon. In diuerſe bodyes the ſoule is ſayde to be thrée folde, that is to ſaye, Vegetabilis that giueth lyfe, and no féeling, and that is in plants and rootes, Senſibilis, that giueth life & féeling, and not reaſon, that is in vnſkilfull beaſts, Racionalis that giueth lyfe, féeling, and reaſon, and this is in men. The Philoſopher lykeneth the ſoule that is called Vegitabilis, to a Triangle. For as a Triangle hath thrée corners, this manner ſoule hath thrée vertues, of begetting, of nouriſhing, and of growing. And this ſoule Vegetabilis is lyke to a Triangle in Geometrie. And hée lykeneth the ſoule Senſibilis, to a quadrangle ſquare, and foure cornerd. For in a Quadrangle is a line drawne from one corner to another, before it maketh two Triangles and ye ſoule ſenſible maketh two triangles of vertues. For where euer the ſoule ſenſible is, there is alſo the ſoule Vegetabilis, but not backwarde. And hée lykeneth the ſoule Racionabilis to a Circle, becauſe of his perfection and conteining. For of all the figures that be called Iſoperimetra, that is of al the figures of the ſame length the Circle is moſt, and moſt conteineth.
Though the ſoule reaſonable be made perfect in cunning and vertues, as it is ſayde in Liber de Anima: it is moſt perfect, and moſt may conteine in the manner of a Circle, touching the kindly vertues. And therefore who that hath the ſoule reaſonable, hath alſo the power Senſibilis and Vegetabilis, but not contrariwiſe.
¶Of the Soule Vegetable. Chap. 8.
THen the Soule Uegetable, that giueth life, hath vertue of begetting, that is néedefull to multiplye and bring forth his kinde, vertue of nouriſhing to keepe a ſingular thing in
