Page:Berejiklian v Independent Commission Against Corruption.pdf/61

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in relation to the obtaining of the "written approval of the Premier". Clause 12(1) of the Schedule would also apply in those circumstances, and a ruling under cl 12(2), approved by the Cabinet, would prevail and allow the Premier to continue to act.

216 Clause 10(1) requires a Minister who has a conflict of interest to give notice to the Premier in a form required by cl 11(1), and to place that form on the Ministerial Register of Interests.

217 If a matter arises in which a Minister has a conflict of interest during a meeting of the Executive Council, Cabinet or a Cabinet Committee, cll 11(2) and 12 require the Minister, including the Premier, to abstain from participating and being present unless the Premier or chair of the meeting, in the absence of the Premier (including because the Premier is the subject of the conflict), approves otherwise.

218 It follows that none of the material findings made by the Commission with respect to the applicant's conduct after 23 January 2017 involves an error of law because they treated the relevant provisions of the Ministerial Code as applying to the applicant as Premier.

219 Those specific findings are with respect to ACTA at [11.474], and in respect of RCM Stages 1 and 2 at [12.255]. The following findings, common to each, were made. No notice as required by cll 10(1) and 11 of the Schedule was given to the Cabinet or placed on the Ministerial Register of Interests; the applicant did not abstain from participating in decision-making, thereby breaching cl 12(1) of the Schedule as well as s 7(2) of the Code; and the applicant did not seek a ruling from the Cabinet as provided by cl 12(2). In relation to RCM, a further finding was made that the applicant, in breach of cl 11(2), did not comply with her obligations to disclose a conflict of interest in a meeting of the Cabinet or of a Cabinet Committee ([12.241.4]). A similar finding was made with respect to ACTA ([11.474.1.4]).

220 Each of these findings was found to be a substantial breach of the Ministerial Code for the purpose of s 9(1)(d).

221 This ground of review is not made out.

Ground of review 8

222 This ground is:

Further or in the alternative to ground 1, the Commission, having found that a finding of partial conduct under s 8(1)(b) of the ICAC Act must relate to a duty to act impartially (R [11.570]), made a material error of law in finding that Ms Berejiklian's conduct in connection with funding promised and awarded to ACTA and RCM Stage 2 was constrained by a legal duty to act impartially (R [10.363])…

223 It is necessary first to place this ground in context. It is directed to funding promised and or awarded to ACTA and RCM Stage 2. The ground is that there was no legal duty upon the applicant to act impartially when exercising her official functions in relation to those funding proposals.

224 The Commission accepted at [11.570] that a "finding of partial conduct must relate to a duty to act impartially". That statement harks back to the Commission's discussion at [10.351]–[10.363], which was in turn directed to Gleeson CJ's observation in Greiner v