know of it is an empty show, might as well engender thought as any other phenomenon.
The truth is that there is one, and only one, method of refuting materialism: it is to show that matter is precisely that which it appears to be. Thereby we eliminate all virtuality, all hidden power, from matter, and establish the phenomena of spirit as an independent reality. But to do this we must leave to matter those qualities which materialists and spiritualists alike strip from it: the latter that they may make of them representations of the spirit, the former that they may regard them only as the accidental garb of space.
This, indeed, is the attitude of common sense with regard to matter, and for this reason common sense believes in spirit. It seems to us that philosophy should here adopt the attitude of common sense, although correcting it in one respect. Memory, inseparable in practice from perception, imports the past into the present, contracts into a single intuition many moments of duration, and thus by a twofold operation compells us, de facto, to perceive matter in ourselves, whereas we, de jure, perceive matter within matter.
Hence the capital importance of the problem of memory. If it is memory above all that lendsHence the cardinal importance of the problem of memory. to perception its subjective character, the philosophy of matter must aim in the first instance, we said, at eliminating the contributions of memory. We
