from my body to other bodies, whereas in fact I place myself at once in the material world in general, and then gradually cut out within it the centre of action which I shall come to call my body and to distinguish from all others?—There are so many illusions gathered round this belief in the originally unextended character of our external perception; there are, in the idea that we project outside ourselves states which are purely internal, so many misconceptions, so many lame answers to badly stated questions, that we cannot hope to throw light on the whole subject at once. We believe that light will increase, as we show more clearly, behind these illusions, the metaphysical error which confounds the unbroken extensity with homogeneous space, and the psychological error which confounds 'pure perception' with memory. But these illusions are, nevertheless, connected with real facts, which we may here indicate in order to correct their interpretation.
The first of these facts is that our senses require education. Neither sight nor touch is able atObjection derived from the so-called 'education' of the senses.—Real meaning of such education. the outset to localize impressions. A series of comparisons and inductions is necessary, whereby we gradually coordinate one impression with another. Hence philosophers may jump to the belief that sensations are in their essence inextensive, and that they constitute extensity by their juxtaposition. But is it not clear that, upon the
