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very extension of our export of manufactures, be nursing up a foreign, and possibly hostile, commercial navy, which would ere long wrest from us the empire of the seas. It is needless to go farther into details; for the following is the general result of the change which the tonnage of our foreign commerce with all parts of the world has undergone during the last thirty-six years:

"The trade of Great Britain with all Europe has declined from 1802 to 1836,

from 65 to 48 per cent.

With British Colonies in America increased ... 18 to 26 ...

With United American States 6 to 9

With India .... 3¾ to 5

These facts may be considered as decisive against the reciprocity system, so far as the maritime interests of the empire are concerned. They prove, beyond the possibility of doubt, after the most ample opportunity of trying the system by experience has been given, that under the recipocrity system the British flag is gradually becoming extinct in the trade with Continental Europe; and that, if it is continued for ten or fifteen years longer, our whole traffic with Europe will be carried on in the vessels of foreign states. Indeed, it is evident, from the extraordinarily rapid growth of foreign shipping in carrying on the British commerce, that if the present system continues many years longer, the foreign sailors and tonnage employed in carrying on our commercial intercourse, at least with the States of Europe, will be greater than our own; that is to say, we shall have nursed up a race of foreign seamen in our own harbours, and in conducting our own trade, superior in number to those of the British islands—in other words, sharpened, and put into the enemy's hands, the dagger which may at any moment pierce us to the heart.

Real reciprocity with these countries would evidently have consisted in stipulating, that in consideration of our admitting some article in which they had advantages over us, on the same terms as they admitted ours, that they should do the same with some article of our manufacture in which we had the advantage, and they had the worst of it by nature. But we never thought of doing this, but contented ourselves with surrendering to them the whole advantages which the navigation laws gave to our shipping, without ever stipulating even the smallest corresponding advantage in favour of our cotton, hardware, or woollen goods, in which we had by nature the start of them. The consequence has been that our own shipping employed in carrying on the trade with these nations has been almost destroyed, while no benefit whatever has been gained in our exports to these nations by the sacrifice. This decisively appears from comparing our exports to the powers with whom we concluded recipocrity treaties for the last ten years, during which time, in consequence of the action of these treaties, our shipping with them has been dwindling away to nothing. The following table exhibits the value of our exports to the Baltic powers, in 1827 and 1828, and 1835 and 1836:—

Countries. 1827. 1828. 1835. 1836.

Russia, £1,408,970 £1,318,936 £1,752,775 £1,742,433

Sweden, .... 46,731 42,699 105,156 113,308

Norway 39,129 53,582 79,278 79,469

Denmark, .... 104,916 111,880 107,979 91,302

Prussia, .... 174,338 179,145 188,273 160,722.

It is needless to go farther into details, for the following statement by the learned and indefatigable Mr Porter, of the Board of Trade, on that subject is decisive:—"That part of our commerce," says Mr Porter, "which, being carried on with the rich and civilized inhabitants of European nations, should present the greatest field for extension, will be seen to have fallen off under this aspect in a remarkable degree. The average annual exports to the whole of Europe were less in value by nearly 20 per cent in the five years from 1832 to 1836, than they were in the five years that followed the close of the war; and it affords strong evidence of the unsatisfactory footing upon which our trading regulations with Europe are established,