able fallacy of applying the rules of free trade to religion—the dangerous error of leaving the wishes, the demand of the people, to regulate the supply of religious instruction.[1]
"The spontaneous demand (says he) of human beings for religion, is far short of the interest which they actually have in it. This is not so with their demand for food, or raiment, or any article which ministers to the necessities of our physical nature. The more destitute we are of these articles, the greater is our desire after them. In every case where the want of any thing serves to whet our appetite, instead of weakening it, the supply of that thing may be left, with all safety, to the native and powerful demand for it among the people themselves. The sensation of hunger is a sufficient guarantee for there being as many bakers in a country as it is good and necessary for the country to have, without any national establishment of bakers.
"But the case is widely different when the appetite for any good is short of the degree in which that good is useful or necessary; and above all, when just in proportion to our want of it, is the decay of our appetite towards it. Now this is, generally speaking, the case with religious instruction. The less we have of it, the less we desire to have of it. It is not with the aliment of the soul as it is with the aliment of the body. The latter will be sought after; the former must be offered to a people whose spiritual appetite is in a state of dormancy, and with whom it is just as necessary to create a hunger, as it is to minister a positive supply."
Is it not a mockery to contend that the people, who, according to this reasoning, do not know when they want, or what they want, or how much they want, should yet be pronounced the best judges of the quality of the spiritual food most convenient for them—that those whose religious desires are represented as decaying and becoming cold in proportion to the increase of their spiritual destitution, should, in the appointment of their pastor, be invested with the irresponsible and uncontrolled power of gratifying their slightest wish—of indulging their caprice, however unreasonable? The glutton, or the drunkard, whose constitution has been impaired by excesses, may, by skilful treatment, be restored to health; but the physician who undertakes his cure will not leave to such a patient the choice and regulation of his own diet.
No doubt, we are told, that the Veto will generally be exercised with prudence and moderation, and that the mere existence of the power in the people will, of itself, work out the benefit contemplated by the Act, without the necessity of calling that power into active operation. Now, this is either a dishonest or a very short-sighted statement. The Veto is introduced, because the people's power of stating special objections was thought to be inefficient in preventing the intrusion of unqualified or unacceptable ministers. The purpose of the Veto is to give effect to a certain class of objections, which could not be stated, or would not be listened to under the former law. These cannot, of course, be objections to the life, literature, or doctrine of the presentee, which would have been good without the help of the Veto. The form of objection is, that the presentee is unacceptable; but we enquire in vain for its grounds. He is a man of great talent and acquirements, of unquestioned character and orthodoxy; as a preacher, eloquent, impressive, convincing; in private life, distinguished by the most winning and agreeable manners; zealous and industrious in the performance of his duty, beloved and respected by all who know him; above all, he is in the judgment of the presbytery eminently qualified for performing the duties of a parish minister—yet such men as this may be rejected, ay, and have been rejected, under the operation of the Veto Act. We say nothing, in the mean time, of the hardship, or the pernicious influence of such an event. But the grounds of rejection are unexplained—no one but the objectors can tell why he is unacceptable; nay, it is contended that there may exist in the minds of the congregation, objections of too subtle a nature to admit of their being stated, and this is a favourite argument in support of the Veto Act. Objections which cannot be stated, seem to us marvellously like caprice; but let that also pass for the present. The Veto Act is intend-
- ↑ Christian and Civic Economy, vol. i. pp. 89, 90.
