training, or the knowledge to enable them to approach the subject of our naval requirements from the right point of view, and to treat it in that broad, national, and comprehensive spirit which the interests of the empire demand. And yet all propositions for putting the management of the navy into the hands of those who might reasonably be expected to understand the business, and making them directly responsible for their acts, are met by the assertion that it is impossible; and that in this popularly governed country it is absolutely necessary that the chief of the navy must be a parliamentarian, and have a seat in the House of Commons, or at any rate in one of the Houses of Parliament, in order to be able to explain to the Legislature his policy and his intentions, and the means he proposes to adopt for the safety of the country. It is assumed that this direct responsibility is necessary in order to safeguard the nation against professional enthusiasm – a failing which, if a failing, can easily be restrained under the constitution within legitimate channels.
To place the administration of the navy under professional direction may be inconvenient from one point of view; but to say that it is impossible is distinctly opposed to facts, as proved by the practice of other popularly governed countries, and by our own in one of the most critical periods of its career, when it was thought wise to subordinate party to national interests.
If we admit for the sake of argument, as we willingly do, that from one point of view the plan would be inconvenient, we may fairly and without prejudice proceed to point out the inconveniences (to use no stronger term) which have actually arisen, and are patent to all men, of the government of the navy by a party politician.
Thus, in this year 1888, we find ourselves face to face with a condition of affairs which has thoroughly and most naturally alarmed the country. We find that Great Britain has actually abandoned her traditional naval policy of keeping up a navy double the strength of that of any other Power; and we find that she has allowed herself to drift into this new and dangerous policy at a period of her history when she has the most cogent and pressing reasons for pursuing the older and safer policy; when, in short, her maritime interests have vastly increased; and when, in consequence of having become largely dependent upon an ocean-borne food-supply, it is absolutely vital to her that her naval supremacy should be unquestioned. By her supineness and indifference in this matter, and by failing to watch closely and reply promptly to the development of the war navy of her ancient rival across the Channel, she has encouraged that rival to take steps for disputing with her once more the supremacy of the seas, until we see that it is now possible for experts to institute comparisons between the two navies, and to raise a reasonable doubt as to which is actually the stronger at the present moment in effective ships ready for battle. More than that, it is a fact that if we do not count on the British side ships without guns (and we surely have no right to count such ships), France has an actual superiority over us at the present moment in modern armoured battleships, and a large superiority over us in breech-loading guns of heavy calibre. Our nominal superiority, which is dwelt upon and em-
