question of our national defences, to listen to addresses on the subject from naval officers, and to pass resolutions for the purpose of strengthening the hands of the Government, and of assuring it of the hearty support of all classes and political shades in the city of London, if it would undertake to set to work without loss of time to allay the feeling of public uneasiness which existed, by taking immediate steps to strengthen the navy. Addresses were delivered by naval officers, and by a distinguished soldier; and the resolutions proposed were carried unanimously (it was an open meeting), but without any of those more immediate and alarming signs of panic with which the promoters of it had been credited. There was, however, one unfortunate incident which threw a dark cloud over the proceedings, and that was the absence, through a severe and sudden illness, of Admiral of the Fleet Sir Geoffrey Hornby, the leader of the movement, – the ablest and most trusted and respected officer in her Majesty's navy, – who was to have been the principal speaker on that occasion. Sir Geoffrey Hornby's address, though printed, was not read at the meeting, but numerous copies were distributed to those who attended. It was comprehensive, concise, and clear, pointing out the first principles of naval warfare for Great Britain, founded upon the teachings of history, modified by the introduction of steam and ironclads. It entered into the details of a blockade of Toulon, the principal military seaport of France; and showing that such a blockade was essential to our supremacy in the Mediterranean, this very high – nay, highest – naval authority in the country, came to the conclusion that if we took the necessary ships to blockade[1] Toulon, we should have only five left to blockade Brest, where he concluded at least ten French ironclads would be assembled. Thus we should lose the command of the narrow seas around our coasts, and lay the country open to invasion, or starvation by the cutting off of our food-supply, whichever method of reduction the enemy thought proper to apply.
All our best authorities are unanimous in their opinion that if we found ourselves at war with France to-morrow, we should have to make an effort to blockade, or mask, the principal French military ports. There may be differences of opinion as to how this is to be done; but there is apparently no difference of opinion that if it is not done, and the French fleet is free to put to sea and roam where it will, the commerce of England must inevitably be destroyed. And in the present condition of the country this means national defeat, for it cannot exist without its commerce. What, then, are we to say of the wisdom of a great, free, self-governing people, who, knowing these facts, are still content to be put off with promises of amendment at some future date? What should we say of the wisdom of an individual who, having satis-
- ↑ The word "blockade" has given rise to some controversy amongst seamen, as many authorities consider that it would now be impossible to blockade a port under anything approaching to the old conditions; but it is really immaterial whether we use the word "blockade," "observe," or "mask." In any case we mean essentially the same thing – viz., that we must make such arrangements that the force blockaded will not be able to leave its port and put to sea without the extreme probability of having to meet a superior hostile force.
