heading the Government list. As by M. Briand's method the four other seats would be distributed to the candidates of the three lists who would have polled the largest number of votes, they would all go to the Government partisans — that is to say, to MM. Brion, Esnault, Zola, and Tuchet. On the other hand, as shown above, by dividing 100,000, the total number of voters, by 5, the number of Deputies to be elected, the result would be a perfectly equitable division of the seats in the Chamber.
However, if it is certainly almost impossible that in practice this latter case should present itself, there can be absolutely no doubt of the result of the application of M. Briand's system. It would inevitably always tend to reinforce the majority. Even after giving way on that point, M. Briand and the few but active adversaries of the projected electoral reform in the Universal Suffrage Commission of the Chamber sought to get the partisans of the R. P. to give to the majority all the seats unallotted by the division of the totals of the various lists by the electoral quotient. It is undoubtedly a difficult matter to distribute those seats in an absolutely equitable manner. Several methods were proposed, but that which was supported by the most faithful partisans of the R. P. was the allotment of the remaining seat or seats to the list or lists having the largest number of unrepresented votes, after deducting those votes already employed for the election of the Deputy or Deputies allotted to it or them. For example, again supposing five seats have to be filled, and that the total number of voters be 100,000, and that total be divided between three lists, A, B, and C having polled respectively 45,000, 30,000, and 25,000 votes; list A, would by dividing its total by 20,000, the electoral quotient, be entitled to two seats, list B to 1, and list C to 1. The remaining seat would be given to list B because its unrepresented votes would be 10,000, whereas those of lists A and C would be only 5000 each. Thus, lists A and B would both be represented in Parliament by two Deputies and list C by 1.
As neither this method nor any of the others suggested for the distribution of the seats remaining unallotted after the division of the totals of the lists by the electoral quotient was approved, the Commission adopted an amendment presented by M. Painlevé, aoccording to which the lists of a similar political colour can before the election day enter into an arrangement to slump their unrepresented votes together. That method, which has been named "apparentement," however, contains a material concession to the partisans of the system of reinforcing the majority, for it stipulates that if the total suffrages of the allied lists amounts to the absolute majority of all the votes recorded at the election, the unallotted seat or seats are to be attributed to it. Consequently each group of allied
