were reached by ourselves and the 30th American Division, the 32nd British Division and the 2nd Australian Division should pass through and exploit success, seizing if possible the general line Le Tronquay-Levergies and to the north.
In order to fully realize the magnitude of the task which confronted the Division, a short description of the defences opposed to us is necessary. The front line occupied by our troops on the date when the attack was first ordered has already been described. Immediately in front of our line the country dipped towards the St. Quentin Canal. The main natural features were two steepish ravines roughly at right angles to the Canal—one to the left of our positions, down which ran the main Vadencourt Road over Riqueval Bridge, the road known to us as Watling Street; and the other ravine facing towards Bellenglise. Across the ridge between these two ravines ran the first strong system of German defences—a continuous line of trenches protected by a broad belt of wire and with frequent strong-points and machine-gun posts.
At either flank of the divisional sector the main crossings of the Canal—Bellenglise and Riqueval Bridges—were further protected by more belts of wire and by well-sited posts of machine gunners and riflemen.
The St. Quentin Canal on the front to be attacked by the 46th Division was in itself an obstacle which might easily have proved insuperable in the face of a determined enemy. The mere sight of it from our front line trenches inspired respect, and might well have caused fear of the outcome of the attack in the hearts of any but the stoutest soldiers. It divided naturally into two portions. The northern half, whilst less strongly prepared for defence, was much more of a natural obstacle than the southern. From Riqueval Bridge to opposite La Baraque cross-
