dams, there was risk of our guns breaching the banks, allowing the water to drain away, and so diminishing the value of the Canal as an obstacle.
These concrete dams would certainly have served their purpose in such an event, but, although protected above by strips of concertina wire and on their sides by “crows' feet” and other devices, they were a possible means of our troops crossing. There were several of these stoutly built dams along the divisional front, and some of them were actually made use of by the Infantry in the assault.
Beyond the Canal was an extremely strong system of trenches, heavily protected by wire belts, and based upon the village of Bellenglise, the farm of La Baraque, and Harry and Nigger Copses. This line was continued parallel with the Canal to Lehaucourt; but the portion south of Bellenglise was not directly assaulted by our troops, being attacked from the rear by the Brigade detailed to advance on Lehaucourt itself. Between Bellenglise and Magny-la-Fosse were two more continuous lines of trenches protected by wire, while all over the ground to be traversed were sited individual strong-points and machine-gun emplacements disposed after the principle of “defence in depth” much used by the Germans in the last two years of the war.
Altogether, the defences of the Hindenburg Line at this point were as thorough as the science of military engineering, backed by unlimited time and labour, could devise, and the defenders had every reason to believe that no troops in the world could be expected to storm them without colossal losses.
The effect of the battle of the 29th September must be considered in the light of these facts. The confidence of the Germans in both their troops and their defence
