the attack, and during the morning of the attack, without succeeding in getting the lines through to the leading Brigade, which was thus for some time, at a critical period of the battle, cut off from communication with the Division altogether. To add to the troubles of the Signal company, the very openness of the country, while facilitating the laying of cables across country, was fatal to their maintenance. During the dark nights of the 27th/28th and 28th/29th September, transport made little or no attempt to keep to the roads, but was driven across country, intent only on reaching its destination by the shortest route. Lines were cut not once or twice, but twenty or thirty times a night, and linemen were out working practically continuously. Perhaps the most exasperating incident occurred, however, when, on the night before the battle, a cavalry unit which shall be nameless settled down for the night midway between Divisional Headquarters and an important forward communication post, and signalized its arrival by cutting out some hundred yards or so of the three twin cables which formed the main divisional route, in order to use them as a picket line for their horses. After this “Signals” felt that Fate could have no harder blows in store for them.
Communications had to be extended considerably and lines laid to deal with the many extra units which were attached to the Division for the battle. New signal officers appeared every few minutes, bringing with them N.C.O.s dragging new lines to be placed on the Divisional Exchange. Tanks, Cavalry, Artillery, Cyclists—all were represented—but the most numerous of all were the attached Artillery Brigades. Between the arrival of the Division in the area and the night of the 28th September, the strength of the Division in artillery increased from two Brigades of R.F.A. to eight Brigades of R.F.A. and
