recrossed the Canal and shot or bayoneted the gunners. Little trouble from infantry was experienced from this direction, though several feeble counter-attacks were made, one mounted German officer making three separate attempts to rally his men and continuing his efforts until well-directed shots killed both himself and his horse, whereupon the men whom he was trying to rally immediately retired.
It would appear that here the enemy lost his great chance to retrieve the fortunes of the day. The 1st Division Artillery put down a heavy smoke barrage on this flank, which was intended as a protection against enemy action as well as cover from observation for our own troops. In the event the barrage did not prove thick enough to afford a screen for our movements, though the fog at first proved an excellent substitute. Certainly it placed an obstacle in the way of a counter-attack, but a well-organized counter-offensive, supported by plenty of reserves and carried through with as much determination as our troops had shown in the attack, might have placed the 46th Division in an awkward position.
The most charitable explanation of the lack of reaction which was so conspicuous a feature of the enemy's fighting during the day is that he was pinned down to his positions by the demonstrations made by the 1st Division, and was afraid to involve any considerable number of troops in case of our attack extending farther to the south. The ultimate objective of our advance on the right flank of the Division included the village of Lehaucourt, and, in the attack on this village, individual action once more played a conspicuous part. Lieutenant J. N. Wightman, of the 1/6th Sherwoods, having reached his own objective and taken several machine guns, two trench mortars
