no doubt engaged in moving a large proportion of them to positions further back.
It is difficult to estimate how far the fog which played such a decisive part in the winning of the battle was due to natural causes, and how far to the general effect of the bombardment, and in particular to the proportion of smoke shell fired in the barrage. Undoubtedly the latter tended to thicken the fog considerably, but a heavy and persistent mist in the early morning is one of the features of the weather of Northern Europe in the neighbourhood of open water at this particular period of the year. It is likely that the possibility of the occurrence of such a mist had been taken into consideration when plans for the attack were made. In any case, conditions could not have been more favourable.
The enemy had based his defence almost entirely on a cunningly-devised system of machine-gun emplacements arranged to enfilade the Canal and, where possible, the ground west of the Canal. From concrete emplacements approached from behind through winding entrances and with roomy dug-outs beneath them, the “Boche” machine-gunners could sit in comfort with a good store of ammunition, water, and food, and rake the Canal in both directions without the slightest trouble and with very little danger to themselves. Nothing short of a direct hit from a heavy shell would have made an impression on many of these small forts—for they were nothing else—and, theoretically, in clear weather, the passage of the Canal should have been pretty well an impossibility. Nothing is more significant, therefore, than the fact that as one strolls along the banks of the St. Quentin Canal one can see emplacement after emplacement, immensely strong, well-sited and undamaged by our artillery fire. Yet the occupants of these
