cipal feudatories who possessed littoral fiefs should be charged with the responsibility of coast defence, as had been done in the time of the Taikō; and thirdly, that Prince Keiki and the feudal chief of Echizen should be appointed to high office in the Yedo administration.
The Yedo Court was thus confronted by the most serious crisis that had yet menaced its autocracy. Not only were the feudatories openly violating the fundamental law of the Tokugawa,—the law which strictly vetoed all intercourse between them and the Imperial Court,—but, further, the Shōgun was required to accept Kyōtō's dictation in important matters of administration. To obey the Imperial mandate would be practical surrender of governing power; to disobey it would put a deadly weapon into the hands of the extremists. Reason suggested immediate surrender of the executive functions to the sovereign, on the ground that their efficient discharge under a system of divided authority was impossible, and it is not improbable that a courageous course of that kind would have rehabilitated the Shogunate, for the Kyōtō Court could not have ventured to accept the responsibility thus suddenly thrust upon it.
But the Shōgun's advisers failed to grasp the significance of the crisis. No policy suggested itself to them except one of craven complaisance. They signified their intention of complying with the first and third of the Emperor's conditions,
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