JAPAN
per cent to par in the course of four years, reducing its volume at the same time from 150,000,000 to 119,000,000, was a financial enterprise violent and daring almost to rashness. The gentler expedient of a foreign loan—an expedient of recently proved efficacy in Italy's case—would have commended itself to the majority of economists. But it may be here stated, once for all, that until her adoption of gold monometallism in 1897,[1] the foreign money market was practically closed to Japan. Had she borrowed abroad, it must have been on a sterling basis. Receiving a fixed sum in silver, she would have had to discharge her debt in rapidly appreciating gold. Twice, indeed, she had recourse to London for small sums, but when she came to cast up her accounts, the cost of the accommodation stood out in deterrent proportions. A nine per cent loan, placed in England in 1868 and paid off in 1889, produced 4,750,000 yen and cost altogether 11,750,000, in round figures; and a seven per cent loan, made in 1872 and paid off in 1897, produced 10,750,000, and cost 36,000,000. These considerations were supplemented by a strong aversion to incurring pecuniary obligations to Western States before the latter had consented to restore Japan's judicial and tariff autonomy, a point which will be explained by and by. The example of Egypt showed what kind of fate might overtake a semi-independent State falling
- ↑ See Appendix, note 1.
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