WAR APPENDIX
3. Reciprocal recognition of Japan's preponderating inter- ests in Corea and Russia's special interests in railway enterprises in Manchuria, and mutual recognition of the respective rights of Japan and Russia to take measures necessary for the protection of the above-mentioned inter- ests so far as they do not conflict with the principle of Article I and Article II.
4. Recognition by Russia of the exclusive right of Japan to give advice and assistance to Corea in the interests of reform and good government.
5. Engagement on the part of Russia not to impede the eventual extension of the Corean railway into southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China and the Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines.
About ten days after the presentation of the proposals of which the above are essential points, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs suddenly suggested the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Tokio. The Imperial Government, however, not only from the consideration that the progress of the negotiations would be facilitated by conducting them at the Russian capital, but also in view of the changes effected in the Russian administrative organization in Manchuria and the erection of a viceroyalty of the Far East, apprehended that the transfer of the seat of negotiations to Tokio would not conduce to a satisfactory understanding. They accordingly repeatedly objected to the proposed transfer, but the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs was insistent, assigning as the reason for his attitude the Czar's contemplated trip abroad, etc. Again, when the Imperial Government requested the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to accept in principle our proposals as a basis of negotiation, he only agreed to take them in conjunction with the Russian counter-proposals as such bases. The Imperial Government, deeming it disadvantageous to delay any longer the opening of discussions, agreed at length to transfer the seat of negotiations, and requested the Russian Government to present as soon as possible their counter-proposals. It was not until nearly a month later, the 3rd October, that the said counter-proposals were presented.
In those counter-proposals Russia, while having no objection to engage to respect the independence and territorial integrity of Corea, declined to extend the same engagement
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