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miles from the station was the same distance as established during the FAA flight test which was accomplished during the investigation.
Both the pilot's and the copilot's gyrosyn compass indicators were recovered along with both pilot's and copilot's pictorial deviation indicators (FDI). The pilot's compass indicator received substantial impact damage, with the glass and No. 1 pointer missing. The compass card had a beading of 113 degrees. The VOR and ADF pointer selector was set to present VOR readings. The copilot's compass indicator received impact damage which separated the dial and pointer position of the unit. Internal inspection revealed a compass card heading of 114 degrees.
The pilot's FDI received impact damage. However, inspection of the beam coupler control transformer revealed a course setting of 127 degrees. Inspection of the copilot's PDI revealed a course setting of 126 degrees.
1.13Fire
There was no fire.
1.14Survival Aspects
All evidence disclosed that this was a nonsurvivable-type accident. Structural deformation and disintegration throughout the occupiable areas of the fuselage precluded the survival of any occupant.
1.15Tests and Research
The aircraft was being operated on aviation gasoline with an octane rating of 115/145. Following the accident five gallons of fuel from the refueling truck were secured for laboratory testing. Analysis tests of the fuel sample by the Air Force Aerospace Fuels Laboratory at Mukilteo, Washington, reported the fuel as meeting specification requirements and satisfactory for use.
The No. 3 propeller governor, Woodward S/N WH91558, model 5018-114 Hamilton Standard Head P/N 321908, S/N 502005 was tested at Pacific Propeller, Seattle, Washington, on April 30, 1965. The governor head was positioned at 2410 r.p.m.
2. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
2.1Analysis
There was no structural, powerplant, systems, or navigational component failure that contributed to the cause of this accident. The investigation which included an examination of the aircraft at the crash site on the glacier, and the No. 3 propeller governor setting of 2410 r.p.m. most substantively supports the evaluation that the aircraft was in climb altitude configuration, with climb power settings and capable of normal operation.
The aircraft was currently certificated, airworthy, properly maintained and dispatched in accordance with company operational procedures and Federal Aviation Regulations.
Testimony and investigation disclosed that all ground aids and navigational facilities pertinent to the assistance provided this flight, were operating within prescribed operational limitations.
