normally considered maximum for passenger confort in DC-7 aircraft. The radius of turn resulting from a four-degree rate of turn is approximately 4,100 feet. Using these data a flightpath was projected on a heading reciprocal to 170 degrees, beginning at the previously determined point of passage, for 23 seconds at a groundspeed of 206 knots. Application of wind drift then produced a track of 165 degrees. A turn of 4,100 feet radius was then plotted from the resulting track to the reciprocal of a 090-degree heading. The foregoing computations produce a turn to the 170-degree heading beginning at 1825:43. At this time, PAA 212 and EAL 663 were separated by four miles with PAA 212 at the 3 o'clock position of EAL 663. It should be noted that this distance is entirely compatible with the departure controller's testimony. It is also compatible with the captain's estimate of four to five miles separation when EAL 663 started the turn.
All distances and bearings shown on the computed flightpath on Attachment #4 relating to the various traffic advisories or traffic discussions, are well within reasonable tolerances for the range and distance estimates given by the controllers. These estimates were by four different persons and cover a period of time and place in the flightpaths, when the location of either aircraft is not in dispute by any of them, and for the moat part, prior to any emergency. Accordingly, this is considered confirming information for the flightpath shown on Attachment #4.
A further confirming factor is the RR-7 controller's statement that after being advised of EAL 663 being turned to 090 degrees and observing this turn, the aircraft proceeded "approximately three miles or more, possibly five." The distance shown on the probable flightpath measures 3-1/2 miles from the start of the turn to 090 degrees to the beginning point of the turn to 170 degrees. If the turn to 170 degrees had not been delayed, this distance would have been less than three miles.
On the basis of the foregoing, it is believed that the flightpaths depicted in Attachment #4 for both EAL 663 and PAA 212 are representative of the probable flightpaths for the last three minutes of flight prior to the crash.
At the time of this accident the Air Traffic Control Standard Operating Procedures in use, together with the Letter of Agreement and its supplement, were designed to permit routine operations without prior coordination between the arrival and departure controllers. The testimony of the controllers in this instance, however, shows a deviation from standard procedures in that EAL 663 was vectored outside of the airspace normally allocated for departures. This deviation was based upon the DR-1 controller's determination that EAL 663 could not cross the 157 degrees radial of the JFK VORTAC at 4,000 feet, as required by the Standard Operating Procedures. The deviation required initial coordination and subsequent frequent additional coordination between the DR-1 and the AR-3 controllers concerning the headings, and/or the altitudes of their respective aircraft in order that appropriate separation criteria (3 miles horizontally or 1,000 feet vertically) could be provided and maintained. The deviation would also require coordination between the DR-1 controller and the DRHO controller in order to effect an appropriate hand-off of EAL 663 to the New York Center controller. However, the Board finds no record of effective coordination between the controllers. In reaching this conclusion the Board considered the following circumstances:
Initial coordination, limited to the position of each aircraft was effected between the DR-1 controller and the AR-3 controller when the deviation
