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using a two-way radiotelephone recently installed for short distance use between the aircraft in flight or afloat and the local ground station and the stand-by landing launch. This effort was unsuccessful because the apparatus was inoperative. The ship's operator then called the land station in code, on the aircraft's regular radio set, and asked for the landing conditions. The land station replied that he did not have them. The ship's operator relayed that message to the captain and remarked that they should be obtained. The ship's operator then returned his radio to voice frequency and succeeded in hearing part of a conversation between the landing launch and the ground station, in which was mentioned the fact that the ground operator had obtained the landing conditions. The radio operator on board the airplane then asked the ground operator, "How about it?" and was told to stand by until they, the landing conditions, were checked. The ship's operator replied, "O. K., go ahead". The operator in charge of the land station then transmitted the landing conditions, "Wind west 3 Sea slight Kollsman 2992". This message was filed at the San Juan radio station at 5.45 p. m. (EST). This message was not received by the aircraft because it was just about to contact the water, and, an accordance with regular procedure, the operator had turned off the aircraft's radio.
Captain Lorber, during this time, had continued to descend until the aircraft was at an altitude of about 500 feet at a point a few miles west of San Juan Harbor. He then aligned the aircraft with a row of anchored reference landing lights in the harbor and started a final approach.
Mr Jahncke, the Relief Airport Manager, had ordered the crew on the landing launch to prepare equipment for a night landing a considerable period of time before darkness. Seven reference landing lights were arranged an a line 2000 feet long from east to west and parallel with the wind. A red light was placed on the upwind end, a green light on the downwind end and the intermediate lights were white. In using this system of lights as a landing reference, the aircraft usually lands from the green light toward the red light and to the right side of the entire line so that the captain, who is seated on the left side of the aircraft, will have the lights continually within ready visual reference. Before the lights had been arranged, the crew on the launch had ascertained that there were no floating obstacles in the landing area. After placing the lights the launch stood by approximately abeam of the green light and about 300 feet north of it. The company procedure as to project the beam of the landing launch's searchlight in an upwind direction parallel to the row of landing lights so as to enable the landing aircraft to land between the beam from its searchlight and the string of landing lights. However, this was not done an this instance because the beam of the searchlight would have been directed toward the incoming aircraft since it was being brought in downwind and might well have blinded the pilot.
About five minutes after the lights had been strung, the incoming plane was sighted from the launch. Shortly afterwards a white flare was fired from the launch in accordance with regular procedure for the purpose of calling the attention of the aircraft's crew to the general locality of the lights. The radio operator on the launch attempted on four different occasions after the aircraft was sighted to transmit landing conditions to it by radiotelephone but, as previously stated, these attempts were unsuccessful due to the failure of the aircraft's radiotelephone. It is also customary to fire a green flare from the launch during the latter part of the aircraft's approach to indicate that the landing area is clear. Mr Jahncke, in charge of the launch, stated that this was not done because it had not become completely dark.
Before beginning has final approach, the captain elected to land in the direction in which he was then approaching, i. e., toward the east, the direction opposite to that which
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