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low pressure area was centered south of Anchorage, the other just east of the Kamchatka Peninsula. There were no fronts or squall lines affecting the route of the flight.
Each day at 0600 the U. S. Weather Bureau station at the Anchorage Airport 155ues for Reeve Aleutian Airways a 12-hour route forecast covering the Aleutian chain as far west as Shemya. On the day of the accident this forecast drew attention to the low pressure areas previously mentioned and described their anticipated movement. It further indicated that west of Dutch Harbor along the chain there would be scattered to overcast clouds based at 1,000 feet; a broken to over-cast cloud deck above 2,500 feet, tops 5,000 to 10,000 feet; with brief periods of light rain. The freezing level was forecast to be approximately 5,000 feet with light icing occurring between this level and 10,000 feet. Occasional moderate turbulence could be expected between King Salmon and Adak. Between Dutch Harbor and Adak winds aloft at the 8,000-foot level were forecast to be 360 degrees at 25 knots. Winds aloft at lower levels were not contained in this forecast.
The Adak terminal forecast, prepared by the Weather Bureau at Anchorage for the period 1300 of the 24th to 0100 of the 25th, called for a broken ceiling at 2,000 feet with north-northwest winds at 15 knots and occasional light rain.
Surface weather observations recorded at Adak at 1645 indicated broken clouds (8/10 coverage) based at 1,500 feet, with a broken deck above (1/10 observed) based at 7,000 feet; visibility 7 miles; wand west 11 knots; temperature 52; dewpoint 48; altimeter setting 29.95.
Prior to the accident a Navy pilot arriving Adak at 1635 reported a solid overcast at 7,000 feet and CAVU (ceiling and visibility unlimited) above from 100 miles northeast of Adak. He did not observe Great Sitkin Island. Between 1900 and 2030 another Navy pilot flying low near the crash site described the cloud coverage as broken, ceiling 2,000 feet.
The company dispatcher on duty at Anchorage the day of the flight sand that he personally checked the weather information in the Weather Bureau office prior to reporting for duty at 0600. He said also that he briefed Captain Strouse at 0900 and that after this the first officer prepared the flight plan; the flight was then cleared to Cold Bay. He said all dispatching of the flight both at Anchorage and en route was accomplished in a routine manner.
Captain Strouse was first employed by the company in 1950 as copilot. He was upgraded to captain on DC-3 equipment early in 1951 and served in this capacity until September 1955. From this date until March 1957 he was employed elsewhere. He returned to the company in March 1957 as a captain on DC-4 equipment, became senior check pilot in June 1957, and chief pilot in February 1958. He had a total of 12,853 flying hours, of which 1,278 were as captain on DC-4 aircraft.
As chief pilot, Captain Strouse had certain company responsibilities. Among these were: pilot training, including proper accomplishment of all pilot en route and proficiency checks when due; the maintaining of all records pertaining to flight; and the maintaining of records pertaining to the currency of pilots' medical certificates.
