- 12 -
Probable Cause
The Board determines the probable cause of this accident was the failure of the pilot to maintain a positive rate of climb and the premature retraction of the landing gear during a go-around in fog conditions.
Recommendations
As a result of the accident investigation involving Eastern Air Lines Flight 512, DC-7B, N815D, which occurred at Idlewild International Airport, New York, on November 30, 1962, the Board made the following recommendations to the Administrator relating to the methods of observing and reporting runway and prevailing visibilities
1. It was recommended that the Air Traffic Control procedures require the transmission of all operationally significant weather information in terminal areas to approaching aircraft. The FAA by letter dated January 8, 1963, stated that the necessary procedural changes were being prepared.
2. It was recommended that an alternative method be developed to determine runway visibility when the RVR 18 inoperative. This was to be accomplished by utilizing runway observers certificated by the Weather Bureau. On January 14, 1963, the FAA stated that this procedure would be implemented on a trial basis in New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles. The Weather Bureau indicated concurrence with the recommendation on January 8, 1963
3. It was recommended that the Weather Bureau amend their methods of observing and reporting prevailing weather where "partial obscurations" are present. The Weather Bureau indicated concurrence with this recommendation on January 8, 1963.
4. It was recommended that the "Remarks" portion of weather reports be broadcast to aircraft. The FAA informed the Board that a priority project had been initiated to standardize the transmission of weather information from ATC facilities to airmen in flight.
5. It was recommended that the RVR instrumentation in the recently commissioned IFR room of the Idlewild Tower was inadequate. Also, the Board requested a study of the physical arrangement. in all towers where PAR 1s installed. On January 11, 1963, the FAA stated that corrective action was being taken and that a new program would permit installation of five RVR indicators in a tower facility.
Both the Board and the Administrator are aware of the possible detriments to take-off and landing caused by unreported weather phenomena such as the thick patches of fog encountered by WAL Flight 221 after touchdown. It as recognized that non-homogeneous fog conditions when existing beyond an RVR installation or outside of the sphere of visual observation points used for determining prevailing visibility can, under the present methods of measuring visibility, remain unreported. However, as outlined in the FAA Advisory Circular ACC 00-13A, effective February 24, 1965, plans are now in effect to improve the "state of the art" in these areas. It is anticipated that in the future one or more
