Cite as 2010 Ark. 432
In her brief submitted to this court, Calaway contends that section 16-123-108(a) unambiguously imposes individual liability for retaliation because the statute prohibits retaliation by any "person." Johns responds that, in the employment context, the ACRA does not permit a claim for retaliation against an individual supervisor. He contends that only employers are subject to liability for employment-related retaliation.
The basic rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Ward v. Doss, 361 Ark. 153, 205 S.W.3d 767 (2005). Where the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, we determine legislative intent from the ordinary meaning of the language used. Id. In considering the meaning of a statute, we construe it just as it reads, giving the words their ordinary and usually accepted meaning in common language. Id. We construe the statute so that no word is left void, superfluous or insignificant, and we give meaning and effect to every word in the statute, if possible. Id.
There is a distinction in the ACRA between who is subject to liability for employment discrimination in 16-123-107(c)(1)(A) (Repl. 2006) and who is subject to liability for retaliation in section 16-123-108(a). Section 16-123-107(c)(1)(A) prohibits discriminatory acts by employers. On the other hand, section 16-123-108(a) prohibits discriminatory acts by all persons, providing that
[n]o person shall discriminate against any individual because such individual in good faith has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this subchapter or because such individual in good faith made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
