however, to revive in case there was no issue of the marriage. If Milan were given the Emperor was to retain effective hold on the duchy until a son was born; and the gift was declared to be a new fief, not dependent on hereditary rights of the House of Orleans. The King in return was to give a handsome appanage to his son in France. As soon as either of these transfers took place Savoy was to be evacuated, and the questions of right between the King and the Duke were to be decided by arbitration. These public conditions were supplemented by a secret treaty, by which the King was required to aid in procuring a General Council, to give help against the German Protestants, and to assist the Emperor to a peace or durable truce with the Turks. The Dauphin shortly afterwards made a solemn protest before witnesses against the treaty as contrary to the fundamental interests of the kingdom. The Pope was left out in the negotiations, although the religious motive is prominent in the conditions. But Paul was obliged to accommodate himself, and to avoid worse he issued a fresh summons to the Council to meet at Trent on March 15 of 1545.
Thus another stage is reached in the settlement of Europe. The war of 1543-5 differs from preceding wars in that the principal effort was directed on the Netherlands, that an attempt was made on both sides to win substantial support in Germany, that Italy was neglected as no longer offering a favourable ground for attack in spite of the possession of Savoy. It resembles the second war in proving that offensive operations on either side, though in this war more extensive and determined, could not lead to any permanent result. The solidity of the several countries was more abundantly demonstrated. The ugly features of this episode are on the one hand the alliance of Francis with the Turk and the corsairs of Barbary, on the other hand the concessions of Charles to the Protestants of Germany, which involved either treason to the Church or the betrayal of his dupes. But some excuse must be made on the ground of the extremity of his need. Charles was a zealous Churchman, but he could not master fate. So long as he was opposed by France and the Ottomans, ill seconded, even thwarted, by the Popes, he could not in addition take upon himself the task of coercing Protestants in Germany. He and he alone of the Princes in Europe formed a just opinion of the religious danger, and did his best to meet it. His desire for ecclesiastical reform was frustrated by the blind opposition of the Popes. Toleration was forced upon him as a political necessity. But to sacrifice the material to the spiritual was a virtue that lay beyond his ken, and one moreover ill suited to the spirit of the age. After all Charles was a temporal prince, and as such his first duty was to the State which he governed.
The Peace of Crépy set Charles free for the first time in his life to intervene effectually in the affairs of Germany. His religious zeal is
