and Turkish wars. Their real concession was abstention from taking part with the Emperor's enemies, while Charles and Henry VIII invaded the French King's dominions. This time it was John Frederick who made private terms with the Habsburgs without his colleagues' knowledge. In return for an imperial guarantee of the Cleves succession to his wife, the sister of Duke William, in case William's line died out, the Elector of Saxony recognised Ferdinand as Roman King; and the compact was to be sealed by the marriage of John Frederick's son to one of Ferdinand's daughters. Other members of the hostile coalition were detached by the same skilful play upon particularist interests. Gustavus of Sweden and Frederick of Denmark had joined it from fear lest Charles should enforce the claims of his niece Dorothea (daughter of Christian II and Isabella), and her husband, Count Frederick of the Palatinate, to both those kingdoms. These were now abandoned and Francis I was left without allies except the Pope and the Sultan.
The campaign opened in 1544 with a French victory at Ceresole, but the tables were turned in the north. Aided by Lutheran troops Charles captured St Dizier while Henry VIII laid siege to Boulogne. In September the Emperor was almost within sight of the walls of Paris, when suddenly on the 18th he signed the preliminaries of the Peace of Crépy. Many and ingenious were the reasons alleged before the world and to his ally of England. In reality there had been a race between the two as to which should make peace first and leave the other in the grip of the enemy. Had Henry won he might have conquered Scotland, and there might have been no Schmalkaldic war. But Charles had proved the nimbler; it was he and not Henry who was left free to deliver his blows in another direction. At the cost of liberal terms to his foe he had duped one of the allies who had helped him to victory; it remains to recount the fate which befell the other.
