especially to Zurich. Zwingli believed that the Emperor stood behind the castellan, and that movements of troops in Austria foreshadowed an attack upon Zurich-an event which German politics made not unlikely. The Emperor did not indeed himself support the castellan, but he was inclined to approve the war, since it kept the dangerous Swiss employed, and he was not unwilling that Musso should be helped without expense to himself lest, if left without help, the castellan should turn to France. The Swiss Diet was divided by the Graubünden request. The Five Cantons refused help: the Protestants promised it. Zwingli again, in the Privy Council and in closest touch with the French ambassador Meigret, seized the opportunity to revive his far-reaching plan of alliance.
Political means were used for religious objects. An assembly of the Zwinglian allies (May 15) at Zurich determined that the Five Cantons must be forced to allow free way to preaching. An embargo upon trade by land-to check the passage of wine, wheat, salt, and iron-was to be set up against the Five Cantons. It was an unhappy method of compulsion, although it had a precedent in 1438, and had been contemplated in the First Peace of Kappel. The chief responsibility belongs to Bern, who suggested it as an alternative to the war proposed by Zurich. Things drifted nearer to war in spite of representations from France and from the other Cantons: scarcity of food distressed and angered the Catholics; Zurich would only remove the embargo if free preaching were allowed.
The Forest Cantons this time made the first move, and from Zug marched towards Zurich (October 4-9). When news of this reached Zurich, a small band, which in the end reached 1200, under George Göldli set out (October 9); a larger band of 1500 men fairly well equipped started two days later, and Zwingli accompanied them. But there was a lack of enthusiasm and even of preparation. In Bern the people blamed Zwingli for this "parsons' war." The action of Bern indeed was ambiguous; partly owing to trouble nearer home, and partly from aversion to the war. Her contingent was not ready until the crisis had passed. But there is no need to look for open treachery when a house is divided against itself.
The advance guard under Göldli-which was only to keep on the defensive-began the battle at Kappel on October 11; they neglected to charge the enemy when changing their attack, and their position was turned. When the main body under Rudolf Lavater reached the Albis -the position fixed by the Council-the day was practically lost. Its attack upon the 8000 Forest men failed. Zwingli was among the slain, and his body was treated disgracefully as that of a traitor. His stepson, Gerold Meyer, Diebold von Geroldscok, Abbot Joner of Kappel, and others of his friends, perished with him.
The remaining Zurich troops and allies came up (October 24) with the Catholic troops on the Gubel near Zug and were defeated in an
