by natural feelings of justice, may remain undecided. The Duke of Bourbon and Henry VIII had pressed upon him the pursuit of the war, the invasion and dismemberment of France. Had Charles really aimed at European supremacy this course was open to him. But he did not take it, whether from a prudent distrust of his English ally, or from an honest dislike for unjust and perilous schemes of aggrandisement. That he took no pains to use his own victory for the furtherance of the ends of England, may appear at first sight surprising. But Henry VIII had had no part in the victory of Pavia, and almost none in any of Charles' successes. English subsidies had been a factor, though not a decisive factor, in the war, but English armed assistance had been uniformly ineffective. Even before the battle of Pavia Charles had known of Henry's contemplated change of side. Moreover, since the rejection of Henry's plans for the dismemberment of France, the English King had concluded an alliance with Louise of Savoy, the regent of France, and profited by his desertion to the extent of two millions of crowns. Charles owed nothing to Henry at the time of the treaty of Madrid.
Other considerations of a politic nature may have inclined Charles to moderation. The Pope, appalled by the disaster of Pavia, had been preparing against the Emperor an Italian league. Francesco Sforza had been approached and had lent an ear to proposals of infidelity. Venice was secured. Even Pescara, Charles' own servant, had been sounded by Girolamo Morone, the Chancellor of Milan, with the offer of the Kingdom of Naples. Pescara was discontented with the favour and good fortune of Lannoy, with his own position, the conditions of his service, and his rewards. He seems to have hesitated for a moment, but eventually disclosed all to Charles, and threw Morone into prison (July-October, 1525). Sforza was deprived of the chief places in the Milanese, retaining only the citadels of Milan and Cremona; but all this meant further trouble in Italy, and pointed to an understanding with France, although Mercurino Gattinara throughout had urged that no reliance should be placed on French promises. Charles deserves credit for his prudence, if not for his generosity. The notion that Francis' permanent friendship could have been won by any greater liberality can be at once dismissed.
Francis I was liberated at the French frontier on March 17, 1526, leaving his two little sons in his place. He at once made known his intentions by delaying and finally refusing the ratification of the treaty of Madrid; and on May 22, at Cognac, a League was concluded against the Emperor, in which Francesco Sforza, the Pope, Florence, and Venice joined with France. Sforza was to receive the duchy of Milan unimpaired, the States of Italy were to be restored to all their rights, and the French Princes were to be released for a ransom of 2, 000, 000 crowns. Henry VIII gave fair words and encouragement in abundance, but did not join the League. The aid of France was equally illusory. The
